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ABSTRACT 
Shannon M. Couture 
Neurocognition, Social Cognition, and Functional Outcome in Schizophrenia and High-
Functioning Autism 
(Under the direction of David L. Penn) 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to compare two models of the relationships among 
neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome in schizophrenia and high-
functioning autism (HFA).  Forty-five participants with schizophrenia and thirty-four 
participants with HFA completed a battery of neurocognitive and social cognitive tasks, and 
the Social Functioning Scale as a measure of functional outcome.  Composite variables were 
created for all three constructs.  Within the schizophrenia sample, path analyses revealed a 
significant and negative relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome, a 
nonsignificant, positive relationship between social cognition and functional outcome, and 
modest support for social cognition serving as a mediator between neurocognition and 
functional outcome.  Within the HFA sample, neither neurocognition nor social cognition 
significantly predicted functional outcome.  Consistent with previous research, a strong, 
positive relationship between neurocognition and social cognition emerged in both samples, 
although this appears to be more robust for individuals with schizophrenia.  In contrast, only 
a small proportion of the variance in functional outcome was accounted for by the models.  It 
is suggested that use of the Social Functioning Scale may have contributed to these findings.  
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 CHAPTER I 
THESIS OVERVIEW 
    The primary aim of this dissertation is to examine two different models that describe the 
relationships among neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome in 
schizophrenia.  Numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia 
exhibit deficits in neurocognition (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998) and social cognition (Brune, 
2005b; Edwards, Jackson, & Pattison, 2002), and that these deficits are related to functional 
outcome (i.e., social functioning, work functioning, etc.; Brune, 2005b; Edwards et al., 2002; 
Green, Kern, Braff, & Mintz, 2000).  However, research has not elucidated how 
neurocognitive and social cognitive abilities are related to one another, nor has the exact 
nature of their relationship with functional outcome been clarified (Vauth, Rusch, Wirtz, & 
Corrigan, 2004).   
    The following literature review first highlights the importance of functional deficits in 
schizophrenia.  Then, I review what is known about deficits in neurocognition, and its 
association with functional outcome.  It is pointed out that due to the modest amount of 
variance that neurocognition accounts for in functional outcome, that other domains, more 
proximal to actual social behavior, have been explored; social cognition is one such domain.  
Therefore, I provide an overview of social cognition in schizophrenia, focusing specifically 
on two primary areas: emotion perception and Theory of Mind (ToM).  This discussion is 
followed by an examination of the literature on whether neurocognition and social cognition 
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represent independent constructs.  From this section, it is concluded that two different models 
may account for how neurocognition and social cognition relate to functional outcome: 1) a 
significant association between the independent domains of neurocognition and social 
cognition, with each domain having a unique relationship with functional outcome (i.e., the 
“direct effects model,” which will be identified as Model A); 2) social cognition serving as a 
mediator between neurocognition and functional outcome (i.e., the “mediational model,” 
which will be identified as Model B).  This dissertation aimed to extend previous research by 
employing Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to investigate the plausibility of these 
models.  As cognitive skills appear to be deficient in early childhood prior to the onset of 
schizophrenia (e.g., Cornblatt, Obuchowski, Roberts, Pollack, & Erlenmeyer, 1999), while 
social cognitive abilities appear to be relatively intact before illness onset (e.g., Pinkham, 
Penn, Perkins, Graham, & Siegel, 2006), it seems likely that impaired neurocognition may 
affect the acquisition of normal social cognitive abilities (Green & Nuechterlein, 1999; Green 
et al., 2000).  Thus, it is hypothesized that there will be a significant indirect effect of 
neurocognition on functional outcome via social cognition, which would provide support for 
the existence of a mediational relationship among these constructs.   
    A second aim of the proposed dissertation was to investigate whether the direct and 
mediational models evaluated in schizophrenia are unique to this clinical group or merely 
reflective of having significant impairments in social cognition and/or problems functioning 
socially/in the community.  To address this issue, I will compare the structural relationships 
between these constructs in the schizophrenia sample to a comparison group of individuals 
with High-Functioning Autism (HFA).  In contrast to schizophrenia, findings in the autism 
literature indicate the presence of early impairments in cognition and social cognition 
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(Charman, Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird, & Drew, 1998), which suggests that the 
mediational model may not be a good approximation of the data in the HFA sample.  
However, few studies have examined the nature of the relationships among neurocognition, 
social cognition, and functional outcome in autism; thus, this part of the dissertation is 
exploratory. 
 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
    Deficits in social functioning (e.g., communicating with others, maintaining employment, 
and functioning in the community) are observed in many disorders, but are a defining feature 
of schizophrenia (Bellack, Morrison, Wixted, & Mueser, 1990).  Moreover, social 
dysfunction is evident early in those who later develop schizophrenia (Davidson, 
Reichenbert, Rabinowitz, Weiser, & Kaplan, 1999; Dworkin et al., 1993; Walker, 1994), and 
is often present in first degree relatives (Hans, Auerbach, Asarnow, Styr, & Marcus, 2000).  
Thus, social functioning deficits occur before illness onset and may be a vulnerability factor 
for schizophrenia (reviewed in Pinkham, Penn, Perkins, & Lieberman, 2003).  In addition, 
problems with social functioning greatly impact quality of life, as difficulties in 
communicating and maintaining employment are ubiquitous and have a negative impact on 
the lives of individuals with schizophrenia (Penn, Corrigan, Bentall, Racenstein, & Newman, 
1997).  Finally, social dysfunction predicts outcome for those with schizophrenia, such as 
relapse, poor illness course, and unemployment (Perlick, Stastney, Mattis, & Teresi, 1992; 
Sullivan, Marder, Liberman, Donahoe, & Mintz, 1990; Tien & Eaton, 1992).  Thus, social 
impairment is a hallmark characteristic of schizophrenia and has important implications for 
the development, course, and outcome of the disorder. 
    The advent of successful neuroleptic treatment in psychosis and the subsequent transfer of 
individuals with schizophrenia from inpatient to outpatient community settings have likely 
contributed to the growing awareness of marked social dysfunction in
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schizophrenia.  Given this trend, and the aforementioned deleterious effects of poor social 
functioning, there has been growing interest in factors that underlie social dysfunction.  
These findings are complicated by the variability of definitions of social functioning used in 
the literature.  This term has been used to apply to self- or other-report of interpersonal 
behaviors, behavior in community settings (e.g., skill ratings while shopping, self- or other-
report of engaging in inappropriate behaviors such as yelling, or appropriate behaviors, such 
as going to the movies), skills of independent living (e.g., self-care skills, grooming, financial 
skills, etc.), ratings of social skill in laboratory settings, ratings of producing and enacting 
social problem solving, etc.  Accordingly, some researchers have taken to describing this 
conglomeration of skills as “functional outcome,” a broader term which can be applied to all 
of these diverse areas.  This dissertation also uses this terminology; although many of the 
behaviors described in the ensuing review and project are very social in nature, this broader 
term also allows inclusion of other less directly social behaviors, like engaging in activities in 
the community and caring for oneself.   
    Thus, given the interest in furthering understanding of the diverse array of skills 
encompassed in functional outcome, much attention has been turned toward factors which 
may contribute to poor functional outcome.  If the nature of the factors that contribute to poor 
functional outcome can be delineated, interventions may be devised to ameliorate these 
underlying factors, which in turn, may have a concomitant impact on functional outcome.  
This is not trivial, as interventions focused on alleviating symptoms alone are not likely to 
markedly improve functional outcome, as several studies have shown little to no relationship 
between symptoms (particularly positive symptoms) and various areas of functional outcome 
(Appelo et al., 1992; Bellack et al., 1990; Lenzenweger & Dworkin, 1996; Lenzenweger, 
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Dworkin, & Wethington, 1991; Penn et al., 1997).  Studies of treatment programs directly 
aimed at improving functional outcomes, such as increasing work functioning or social skills, 
typically find that improvements in these functioning domains are unrelated to symptoms 
(Bell & Bryson, 2001; Lysaker, Bell, Zito, & Bioty, 1995; Lysaker, Bryson, Davis, & Bell, 
2005; Smith, Hull, Romanelli, Fertuck, & Weiss, 1999).  Moreover, in a community-based 
psychosocial rehabilitation program, symptom and functional outcome change appeared to be 
distinct, with unassociated change trajectories (Brekke & Long, 2000).  Finally, although 
CBT-based interventions have been successful in reducing symptoms, there is little evidence 
to suggest these improvements generalize to functional outcome (Cather, Penn, Otto, Yovel, 
Mueser, & Goff, 2005; Garety, Fowler, & Kuipers, 1997; Gumley, O’Grady, & McNay, 
2003).  Thus, attention has been turned to other factors that should theoretically relate to 
problems with social functioning.  In the next sections, I will review the literature concerning 
two such factors, neurocognition and social cognition, followed by a discussion of the 
relationship between these constructs in schizophrenia. 
Neurocognition and Schizophrenia 
 Neurocognition (also referred to in the literature as cognition or non-social 
cognition) was originally conceptualized as having a role in social impairments because 
basic cognitive skills were considered to be requisite for the acquisition of social knowledge 
and social skills, or for helping the individual use these skills flexibly in social situations 
(reviewed in Pinkham et al., 2003).  Neurocognition is comprised of a wide variety of areas 
such as verbal and nonverbal memory, verbal fluency, visuoperceptual abilities, attention, 
executive functioning and cognitive flexibility, motor speed, and general cognitive ability 
such as IQ.   
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    Heinrichs and Zakzanis (1998) conducted a thorough review of the literature, 
encompassing 204 studies.  They found evidence for moderately large and reliable 
impairments in performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test, a measure frequently used to 
assess executive function or cognitive flexibility.  A similar deficit was found in general 
intellectual ability, and IQ and executive processing were significantly correlated with one 
another.  Across studies, reliable deficits in motor functioning, attention, spatial ability, and 
verbal fluency were also found.  Heinrichs and Zakzanis concluded that significant cognitive 
impairments are present in schizophrenia, which is consistent with other comprehensive 
reviews of the field (Blanchard & Neale, 1994; Hoff & Kremen, 2002).   
    Although a generalized neurocognitive deficit has been supported in the majority of 
studies, there is variability in the magnitude of deficits across domains and across 
investigations.  Furthermore, there is evidence of considerable within group differences, as 
some individuals are less impaired on neurocognitive tasks.  In general, memory, executive 
functioning, and attention demonstrate the most consistent impairments in the preponderance 
of studies (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998; Hoff & Kremen, 2002).  
Neurocognition and Functional Outcome   
    Much of the recent enthusiasm for studying neurocognition in schizophrenia is based on its 
association with functional outcome (Green, 1996).  Among the various neurocognitive 
variables, executive functioning, which typically includes such abilities as planning and 
cognitive flexibility, appears to have one of the most reliable relationships with functional 
outcome.  It is thought that executive functioning can be helpful in planning courses of 
action, attempting to solve social problems, remaining flexible, and being able to change 
one’s behavior in a social situation.  Meltzer and McGurk (1999) found evidence for a 
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relationship between work functioning and executive functioning, as regression analyses 
revealed that executive functioning was able to differentiate between three levels of work 
groups.  This finding is supported by other studies which have found evidence for the role of 
executive functioning abilities in work performance (McGurk & Mueser, 2003; McGurk, 
Mueser, Harvey, LaPuglia, & Marder, 2003).  Executive functioning has also shown a 
relationship with community functioning (Green & Nuechterlein, 1999; Rempfer, Hamera, 
Brown, & Cromwell, 2003), and accounted for 6% of the variance in successful completion 
of activities of daily living in another study (self-care skills; Velligan, Bow-Thomas, 
Mahurin, Miller, & Halgunseth, 2000).  Addington and Addington (1999; 2000) found 
cognitive flexibility was associated with being able to define or identify the nature of social 
problems.  However, in contrast to Green and Nuechterlein (1999), they found no 
relationship between executive functioning and general social and community functioning as 
assessed by the Social Functioning Scale (which assesses a variety of behaviors in functional 
outcome).  Another negative finding is Brune (2005a), who found that severe social and 
behavior problems as measured on the Social Behavior Scale were not related to executive 
functioning.  However, in two reviews of the literature, it was concluded that executive 
functioning was dependably related to community functioning, inconsistently related to 
social skills, and not associated with social problem solving (Green, 1996; Green et al., 
2000). 
    Memory abilities have also been investigated in relation to functional outcome in 
schizophrenia.  Remembering who people are, their history, social scripts, and social 
knowledge are all necessary social processes, and these abilities can be conceptualized as 
requiring intact memory for adequate performance.  Research generally supports a 
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correlational association between memory and functional outcome in schizophrenia.  For 
example, individuals with schizophrenia who were employed full-time performed 
significantly better on working memory tasks than those who were unemployed (Meltzer & 
McGurk, 1999), and working memory has been associated with independent living skills 
(Rempfer, Hamera, Brown, & Cromwell, 2003; Revheim, Schechter, Kim, Silipo, 
Allingham, Butler, & Javitt, in press).  Likewise, recognition and recall memory was 
significantly associated with interpersonal problem solving (Corrigan & Toomey, 1995).  
Verbal memory has shown significant associations with community functioning (Green, 
1996; Green & Nuechterlein, 1999; Reeder, Newton, Frangou, & Wykes, 2004; Smith, Hull, 
Goodman, Hedayat-Harris, Willson, Israel, & Munich, 1999; Velligan et al., 2000), social 
problem solving (Addington & Addington, 1999; 2000), and accounted for 20% of the 
variance in work functioning (Bryson, Bell, Kaplan, Greig, & Lysaker, 1998; Velligan et al., 
2000), 13% of the variance in social competence, and 15% in activities of daily living 
(Velligan et al., 2000).  Although one study found no evidence to support a relationship 
between verbal memory and social skills at work (Bryson et al., 1998), in general, reviews of 
the literature support the role of memory in functional outcomes (Green, 1996; Green et al., 
2000; Reeder et al., 2004). 
    Verbal abilities, as measured by verbal IQ, vocabulary proficiency, and verbal fluency, 
have also been implicated in normal social interactions.  Verbal ability is related to social 
problem solving and severe social problems in schizophrenia (Addington & Addington, 
1999; 2000; Brekke et al., 1997; Brune, 2005a), as well as independent living skills (Rempfer 
et al., 2003).   However, other studies have not found support for a relationship between 
verbal ability and functional outcome (Addington, McCleary, & Munroe-Blum, 1998; Green, 
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1996).   Nevertheless, reviews of the literature indicate that verbal fluency is related to 
general community outcome (Green et al., 2000), and that verbal IQ is inconsistently related 
to social problem solving (Green, 1996). 
     Attention (or vigilance) has also received some interest in the literature given the 
necessity of sustained attention in order to have successful conversations and attend 
appropriately to social cues, which are typically presented for only brief periods of time.  
Indeed, vigilance is related to employment status and work functioning (Meltzer & McGurk, 
1999; Velligan et al., 2000), higher global social competence (Penn, Mueser, Spaulding, 
Hope, & Reed, 1995; Velligan et al., 2000), social problem solving (Bowen, Wallace, Glynn, 
Nuechterlein, Lutzker, & Kuehnel, 1994), and general community functioning (Green, 1996; 
Green & Nuechterlein, 1999; Prouteau, Verdoux, Briand, Lesage, Lalonde, Nicole, Reinharz, 
& Stip, 2004).  Another study found vigilance to be significantly associated with providing a 
solution and enacting the solution to social problems, but not with general social and 
community functioning (Addington & Addington, 2000; Addington et al., 1998).  In general, 
among various indices of functional outcome, attention tends to show the most consistent 
relationships with social problem solving and social skills (Green, 1996). 
    Visuospatial abilities may impact the way people inspect social cues and information for 
the purpose of gleaning insight into proper behavioral responses to social situations.  For 
example, scanning the face for cues indicating emotional expressions is a complex process 
that requires intact visual processing strategies.  Although two studies found evidence for a 
relationship between visuospatial skills and functional outcome (Brekke et al., 1997; 
Dickerson, Boronow, Ringel, & Parente, 1996), two did not (Addington & Addington, 2000; 
Addington et al., 1998).  Finally, psychomotor speed has been examined in a few studies, and 
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was related to general community functioning, social problem solving, social skills (Green et 
al., 2000), daily problem-solving/independent living skills (Revheim et al., in press), and 
work functioning (Evans, Bond, Meyer, Won Kim, Lysaker, Gibson, & Tunis, 2004).  It 
should be noted that relatively few studies have examined the association between 
visuoperceptual processes or psychomotor ability and functional outcome in comparison to 
other neurocognitive abilities; thus, confident conclusions cannot be drawn at this time. 
     In addition to findings on specific neurocognitive abilities, studies have also combined 
measures of neurocognitive functioning to ascertain their collective association with 
functional outcome.  For example, a neurocognitive composite index explained 16 to 30% of 
the variance in various functional outcomes in one study (Velligan et al., 2000), and 
approximately 45% of the variance in social functioning in a second study (Velligan et al., 
1997).  In contrast, only 7% of the variance in vocational functioning was accounted for in a 
third study (Vauth et al., 2004), and did not enter a stepwise regression model predicting 
general social functioning in a fourth (Sponheim, Surerus-Johnson, Spoont, & Dieperink, 
2003).  McGurk and colleagues (2000) conducted a longitudinal study with 168 geriatric 
patients with chronic schizophrenia, and found evidence for a link between their 
neurocognition composite and social functioning beyond the influence of baseline social 
functioning.  Specifically, the neurocognitive composite accounted for 3.6% of the variance 
in social functioning one year later, after the effect of baseline functioning had been 
statistically removed.  Thus, even in a sample with poor social functioning and a chronic 
course of schizophrenia, cognitive functioning was still predictive of a small proportion of 
variance in current social functioning (McGurk et al., 2000).  These findings are similar to 
those found in a first-episode sample, as neurocognitive impairment accounted for 4-6% of 
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the variance in social functioning at 1 and 2 years (Addington, Saeedi, & Addington, 2005).  
Overall, it appears that composite measures of neurocognitive functioning account for 20 to 
60% of the variance in various functional outcomes (Bell & Bryson, 2001; reviewed in Green 
et al., 2000).  
    Thus, individuals with schizophrenia clearly demonstrate deficits in most areas of 
neurocognitive functioning.  Reviews of the literature generally conclude that there are 
significant associations between memory processes and executive processing with poor 
functional outcome, with a recent review also supporting a link between baseline 
neurocognitive functioning and functional outcome at some later time point (Green, Kern, & 
Heaton, 2004).  Other aspects of neurocognition, such as verbal fluency, motor speed, 
vigilance, and visuoperceptual abilities have not (yet) demonstrated a consistent relationship 
with functional outcome.  Finally, composite measures of neurocognition account for 
approximately 20-60% of the variance in functional outcome in schizophrenia. 
Limitations of the Neurocognitive Approach to Understanding Functional Outcome 
    While most of the aforementioned studies found evidence for a significant relationship 
between at least one aspect of neurocognition and functional outcome, the amount of 
variance accounted for is typically rather modest (Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000; Penn et 
al., 1997).  In fact, although Green et al. (2000) reported that 20-60% of the variance in 
functional outcome could be explained by composite measures of neurocognition, closer 
inspection of that review reveals that the variance accounted for by most of the studies was in 
the 20-40% range; studies reporting variance estimates of greater than 40% were the 
exception, rather than the rule.  Thus, anywhere from 60-80% of the variance in functional 
outcome is unaccounted for by traditional neurocognitive measures. 
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    Recall that one rationale for identifying factors that relate to functional outcome is that 
they may prove to be sound targets for interventions (both pharmacological and 
psychosocial).  Thus, remediation of neurocognitive deficits should result in improvements in 
various indices of functional outcome.  Unfortunately, this has not been the case.  Although 
research has shown that deficits on particular neurocognitive tasks can indeed be 
significantly improved after neurocognitive training, generalization of improvements to 
similar neurocognitive tasks has not been consistently demonstrated (Kurtz, Moberg, Gur, & 
Gur, 2001).  Furthermore, recent reviews of the neurocognitive remediation literature have 
concluded that, in general, there is scarce evidence for a significant impact on functional 
outcome (Kurtz et al., 2001; Pilling et al., 2002). This suggests that other factors may 
underlie social impairments in schizophrenia and may be appropriate targets of psychosocial 
interventions.  
     Independent research groups have suggested that the field of neurocognition in 
schizophrenia has been largely atheoretical, and that attention must focus on identifying 
mediators and other factors involved in functional outcome in order to form a more 
theoretically-based approach to the study of neurocognition in schizophrenia (Green et al., 
2000; Penn et al., 1997).  In addition, Green et al. concluded the mediators themselves might 
be identified as intervention targets, which would likely improve the effectiveness of 
treatments aimed at ameliorating social and community functioning deficits.  Social 
cognition is a likely candidate for mediation, as it has conceptual links with both 
neurocognition and functional outcome.  Specifically, it has elements of the basic 
neurocognitive abilities typically assessed (such as information processing), but it goes 
beyond these basic abilities to process more complex and personally relevant social 
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information.  It also has clear links with functional outcome, as the rapid processing of a 
variety of social stimuli is essential for social interaction, and problems in this area can 
impact peer, romantic, and family relationships in addition to work/school behavior.  In 
addition, appropriate assessment of social cues from the environment (such as if someone 
increases distance or makes a facial expression as a cue for body odor) as well as interacting 
with others to learn skills such as home and financial care, can have important implications 
for skills of daily living.  Thus, social cognition is thought to be an important contributing 
factor to functional outcome, and has a theoretical basis as a potential mediator for the 
relationship between neurocognition and poor functional outcome (Green et al., 2000; Kee, 
Kern, & Green, 1998; Penn et al., 1997).   
Social Cognition and Schizophrenia 
     There are several definitions of social cognition that have been proposed in the diverse 
literatures of social psychology, evolutionary psychology, biological psychiatry, and clinical 
psychology.  Fiske and Taylor (1991) defined social cognition as the “way in which people 
make sense of other people” (p.1), which is similar to Roloff and Berger’s (1982) definition 
that “social cognition represents the organized thoughts people have about human 
interaction” (p.21), and Ostrom’s (1984) definition stating that social cognition is “a domain 
of cognition that involves the perception, interpretation, and processing of social 
information” (p.176).  Social cognition has been viewed by some researchers as a set of 
abilities that developed because it became beneficial from an evolutionary standpoint to be 
able to make sense of a complex social environment (Brune, 2005b).  However, the most 
comprehensive definitions are those that link social cognitive abilities to real-world 
functioning.  Brothers’ (1990) definition described social cognition as the “mental operations 
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underlying social interactions, which include the human ability and capacity to perceive the 
intentions and dispositions of others” (p.28).  Similarly, Adolphs (2001) identified social 
cognition as “the ability to construct representations of the relation between oneself and 
others and to use those representations flexibly to guide social behavior” (p.231). 
    Thus, most definitions of social cognition share the idea that social cognition is a set of 
related neurocognitive processes applied to the recognition, understanding, accurate 
processing, and effective use of social cues and information in real-world situations (Penn et 
al., 1997).  In schizophrenia, the most commonly studied domains of social cognition include 
emotion perception and Theory of Mind (ToM; Green, Olivier, Crawley, Penn, & Silverstein, 
2005; Pinkham et al., 2003).  The general research findings on these domains (in 
schizophrenia) are reviewed next. 
Emotion Perception 
    Emotion perception (also called emotion recognition, affect recognition, or affect 
perception) is the ability to ascertain emotional information (i.e., what the other person is 
feeling) from facial expressions, vocal inflections (i.e., prosody), body movement, or some 
combination of these.  Stimuli in facial emotion recognition studies typically include static 
facial expressions to which the person identifies an emotion label or designates whether pairs 
of faces are depicting similar or different emotions.  Emotional prosody stimuli require 
participants to match an emotion label to a content-neutral sentence presented verbally with 
vocal inflection and intonation used to express emotions.  Finally, some studies have used 
video stimuli (with actors depicting emotions and/or participating in emotional social 
interactions) including a combination of these features to assess accurate emotion 
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recognition.  Thus, stimuli used to assess emotion perception vary in visual complexity and 
in the number of cues available to the respondent. 
    The majority of studies examining emotion perception abilities have concluded that 
individuals with schizophrenia tend to perform worse than non-clinical controls on tasks of 
facial and vocal emotion recognition.  In general, deficits in emotion perception have been 
observed in both chronically ill outpatient (Hellewell, Connell, & Deakin, 1994; Hooker & 
Park, 2002; Kohler, Bilker, Hagendoorn, Gur, & Gur, 2000; Kohler et al., 2003; Sachs, 
Steger-Wuchse, Krypsin-Exner, Gur, & Katschnig, 2004; although see Joseph, Sturgeon, & 
Leff, 1992 for an exception) and inpatient samples (Archer, Hay, & Young, 1992; Brune, 
2005a; Feinberg, Rifkin, Schaffer, & Walker, 1986; Heimberg, Gur, Erwin, Shtasel, & Gur, 
1992; Kerr & Neale, 1993; Mueser et al., 1996; Novic, Luchins, & Perline, 1984; Penn et al., 
2000; Salem, Kring, & Kerr, 1996; Walker, Marwit, & Emory, 1980; Walker, McGuire, & 
Bettes, 1984).  Of note, some studies have also found evidence for a deficit in face 
recognition (i.e., being able to identify the identity of faces rather than emotion) of similar 
magnitude to deficits in emotion recognition, or have concluded there is no longer evidence 
for a deficit in emotion recognition after the effect of face recognition has been statistically 
removed (e.g., Kerr & Neale, 1993; Salem et al., 1996; see Penn et al. 2000, for an 
exception).  These findings suggest that impairments in emotion perception may be due, in 
part, to basic face processing deficits.  This issue will be explored in more depth in the 
following section.   
    In addition, the valence of the emotion is related to performance on affect recognition 
tasks.  Happiness is generally the easiest emotion to identify, which is consistent with 
research showing that individuals with schizophrenia are not impaired when making emotion 
 17 
judgments concerning this affect (Gosselin, Kirouac, & Dore, 1995; Russell, Suzuki, & 
Ishida, 1993).  Surprise, the only other commonly studied positively-valenced emotion, is 
also thought to be less difficult to identify by some researchers (Kline, Smith, & Ellis, 1992), 
but not others (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993).  Conversely, there is consistent evidence 
that individuals with schizophrenia are significantly impaired in perceiving negatively-
valenced emotions (Cramer, Weegman, & O’Neil, 1989; Mandal & Rai, 1987; Zuroff & 
Colussy, 1986), specifically fear (Archer, Hay, & Young, 1994; Gaebel & Wolwer, 1992, 
Mandal & Palchoudhury, 1985; Kohler et al., 2003), anger (Mandal & Palchoudhury, 1985; 
Morrison, Bellack, & Mueser, 1988), and sadness (Archer et al., 1994; Kohler et al., 2000; 
Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Shtasel, 1995).  These findings make sense in light of recent 
evidence suggesting that neural underpinnings of emotion perception may be specific to the 
valence of the emotion (e.g., Davidson, 2000; Jansari, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2000). 
    In sum, reviews of the literature indicate that individuals with schizophrenia are impaired, 
relative to non-clinical controls, in emotion perception, with these impairments most 
consistent for negative emotions.  It is important to note that the majority of the studies have 
not included a variety of emotion perception tasks within the same study.  This may be a 
critical omission as there appears to be no single emotion perception task that adequately 
assesses this construct, and that schizophrenia-related deficits may vary as a function of task 
characteristics (e.g., emotion identification versus matching; identifying static faces versus 
complex scenes; Edwards et al., 2002; Mandal, Pandey, & Prasad, 1998; Penn et al., 1997).  
In addition, emotion perception ranges from simply identifying the affect expressed in a 
social stimulus (e.g., “angry”), to more complex judgments about what this affect means 
(e.g., that the angry person should be avoided or not trusted).  Therefore, in order to obtain a 
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comprehensive understanding of emotion perception in schizophrenia, a range of emotion 
perception tasks that vary in how the emotional information is presented (e.g., faces versus 
social scenes) and/or in the types of judgments required (i.e., identifying affect versus 
making dispositional judgments of trustworthiness) was included in this dissertation. 
ToM   
    ToM involves both the ability to understand that others have mental states different from 
one’s own, and the capability to make inferences about the content of those mental states 
(e.g., others’ intentions).  Frith (1992) has that argued ToM skills might develop normally in 
those with schizophrenia, but deteriorate after the onset of psychosis, although there is no 
direct empirical support for this assertion (Brune, 2005b).  ToM is typically (although not 
exclusively) assessed with first- and second-order false belief tasks.  First-order ToM is the 
understanding that another person can hold a false belief about the world; whereas second-
order ToM involves the understanding one can have an incorrect belief about someone else’s 
incorrect belief.  The “Sally-Anne” task is one of the most commonly used first-order tasks 
whereby participants are told a story about a girl, Sally, who hides an object and leaves the 
room.  Subsequently, her friend, Anne, comes into the room and moves the hidden object to 
another hidden location.  If one has first-order ToM abilities intact, one would recognize that 
Sally would look for her object in the original hidden location, because she does not know 
Anne has placed the object in a different location.  In essence, participants would need to 
differentiate between their own mental state (i.e., they know the true location of the object) 
and Sally’s mental state (i.e., she believes the object is in its original location).  
    In second-order tasks, like the “Ice Cream Van” story, participants are told a story in 
which characters learn new information at different points in time.  For example, a boy and 
 19 
girl are told an ice cream van will be in the park all day.  The children go their separate ways.  
The boy talks to the ice cream van driver and finds out the van is headed to the church.  The 
girl also finds out this piece of information, but separately from the boy.  A person with 
intact second-order ToM would understand that the girl, who knows the boy has gone to buy 
ice cream, will look for the boy in the park rather than the church.  Thus, one character (the 
girl) will falsely believe another character (the boy) maintains an incorrect view of reality 
because she is unaware that he has obtained additional information out of her presence.  
These tasks are typically accompanied by “reality” questions (e.g., “Where is the boy really 
going?”) to ensure participants comprehend the situation, in addition to the ToM questions 
(e.g., “Where does the girl think the boy went to get ice cream?”).  More recently, other tasks 
have been developed, such as Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001) Eyes Task, where individuals 
ascertain mental states from the expression in the eyes, and the Hinting task (Corcoran, 
2001), which requires participants to guess a character’s intentions based on a verbal 
statement or hint (e.g., a child who wants some candy may say to his mother at the 
supermarket: “Oh, that chocolate looks good.” The participant would be asked what the child 
meant by that statement).   
    In this project, ToM was only assessed with the Eyes Task, as the social cognitive battery 
was set prior to this dissertation (see Methods).  Of course, this represents a limitation, as it 
would have been optimal to sample a variety of ToM tasks (including those that address first- 
and second-order beliefs), so as to adequately capture the ToM construct.     
    In general, individuals with schizophrenia have deficits in ToM abilities, with these 
impairments being most consistent for second-order ToM tasks (reviewed in Brune, 2005b; 
Penn, Addington, & Pinkham, in press; Pickup & Frith, 2001).  It has been argued that 
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individuals with schizophrenia perform normally on first-order ToM tasks (Doody, Gotz, 
Johnstone, Frith, Cunningham-Owens, 1998) because they are capable of understanding that 
other people have different mental states, thoughts, or intentions than they do, but have 
difficulty correctly interpreting cues to appropriately ascertain the mental states of others, 
which is necessary for second-order tasks (Brune, 2003).   
    These impairments in ToM are present in schizophrenia regardless of whether individuals 
are acutely ill (Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995; Drury, Robinson, & Birchwood, 1998; Frith 
& Corcoran, 1996; Pickup & Frith, 2001) or when their symptoms are remitted (Herold, 
Tenyi, Lenard, & Trixler, 2002; Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles, & van Os, 2003; Sarfati, 
Hardy-Bayle, Besche, & Widlocher, 1997), although the deficits are not as pronounced as 
during acute psychosis.  In addition, ToM deficits are present across both inpatient and 
outpatient samples (Brunet, Sarfati, & Hardy-Bayle, 2003; Langdon, Davies, & Colthart, 
2002; Langdon et al., 1997; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Brunet, & Widlocher, 1999), and they are 
not associated with any specific symptom type (e.g., paranoia; see Brune, 2005b for a 
review).  Thus, it appears problems with ToM are trait deficits, although they may be 
exacerbated during an acute episode (i.e., have elements of state dependence as well). 
    A prominent issue is whether ToM impairments in schizophrenia are a result of lower IQ, 
rather than a specific deficit in social cognition.  Corcoran et al. (1995) found that deficits in 
ToM abilities remained after controlling for IQ, a finding that has been replicated in several 
other studies (Brune, 2005a; Brunet et al., 2003; Janssen et al., 2003; Kington, Jones, Watt, 
Hopkin, & Williams, 2000; Mazza, DeRisio, Surian, Roncone, Casacchia, 2001; Mitchley, 
Barber, Gray, Brooks, & Livingston, 1998; however see Brune, 2003 for an exception).  
Doody and colleagues (1998) examined ToM in schizophrenia participants, participants with 
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a mild learning disability, individuals with both schizophrenia and a learning disability 
(“comorbid group”), and normal controls.  Schizophrenia participants with normal IQs 
differed from normal controls on the second-order task, and performance was not related to 
IQ.  In the comorbid group and the learning disabled alone group, IQ had an effect on task 
performance.  When participants who did not understand the task (as evidenced by incorrect 
responses to reality questions) were eliminated, there was no longer an effect of IQ on the 
results, and the difference between schizophrenia and normal participants remained.  Thus, in 
this study, level of IQ was associated with participants’ general ability to comprehend ToM 
scenarios, although having a psychotic disorder also had an impact on performance.  Taking 
all these studies under consideration, Brune (2005b) concluded that ToM deficits are 
relatively independent of intellectual functioning and thus not reflective of general cognitive 
impairments.   
    Given the existence of these two cognitive domains, neurocognition and social cognition, 
the next question is whether they represent a single or separate constructs.  Thus, in the 
ensuing section, I review the research that has examined the relationship between 
neurocognition and social cognition in schizophrenia.  
Social Cognition and Neurocognition: A Differentiation that is Worth Making? 
    Several researchers have questioned whether there is a specific deficit in social cognition 
in schizophrenia, or whether a generalized performance deficit across domains can account 
for findings (note this debate is most frequently brought up with emotion perception studies 
in particular; e.g., Bryson, Bell, & Lysaker, 1997; Johnston, Katsikitis, & Carr, 2001; Penn et 
al., 2000).  In other words, can deficits in social cognition be accounted for by 
neurocognitive deficits?  The argument in support of a generalized deficit is based on 
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research showing that individuals with schizophrenia perform similarly across measures of 
affect perception and face recognition (Kerr & Neale, 1993; Salem et al., 1996) and that 
measures of social cognition and neurocognition are significantly associated with one another 
(Bozikas, Kosmidis, Anezoulaki, Giannokou, & Karavatos, 2004; Brune, 2005a; Kohler et 
al., 2000).   
    Although the arguments for a generalized deficit have merit, there appears to be sufficient 
evidence to support conceptualizing these domains as relatively separate.  In the following 
section, I will highlight several areas of research (and conceptual arguments) supporting 
dissociations between neurocognition and social cognition.  Specifically, I will discuss: 1) 
differences in how these constructs are measured and coded; 2) studies which have shown a 
dissociation between neurocognition and social cognition based on either differential deficit 
designs or neural models; 3) the typically modest relationship between neurocognition and 
social cognition; and, 4) preliminary support for independent relationships between 
neurocognition or social cognition with functional outcome. 
    First, when the study of social cognition in schizophrenia initially emerged, Penn and 
colleagues argued that a face valid, although not empirical means, of contrasting these 
constructs, is comparing the tasks used to assess them (Penn et al., 1997).  For example, 
neurocognitive stimuli are often affectively neutral or nonsensical (in schizophrenia 
research), whereas most social cognitive measures include some type of emotional or 
personally relevant information.  Second, in social cognition, attributes of the stimuli that 
cannot be observed (e.g., someone’s mental state) are often the construct of interest, but most 
of the characteristics and the corresponding answers to items in cognitive stimuli are directly 
observable.  Finally, absolute correctness is not a common index of performance on social 
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cognitive tasks.  For example, research on attributions in schizophrenia shows that 
attributional biases characterize persecutory delusions (i.e., blaming others rather than 
situations for negative outcomes), which does not correspond to a “correct-incorrect” 
distinction.  In contrast, many of the neurocognitive tasks in schizophrenia research have a 
correct answer, such as only having one possibility of making the fewest moves to solve a 
puzzle, or a finite number of categories to sort cards (although responses styles in signal 
detection paradigms are obvious exceptions, among others; Penn et al., 1997).   
    Second, investigations into the neural substrates underlying neurocognition and social 
cognition have suggested there are two brain systems involved in the processing of emotions: 
a ventral system, including the amygdala, ventral anterior cingulate gyrus, and ventral 
prefrontal cortex, which plays a role in identifying emotion; and a dorsal system, including 
the hippocampus, dorsal regions of the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the dorsal prefrontal 
cortex, which is involved in the allocation of attention, planning, and effortful behavior 
(Bozikas et al., 2004; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003).  Furthermore, some 
researchers have concluded there is evidence to support the presence of a “social cognitive 
neural circuit,” incorporating the amygdala, fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, and 
prefrontal cortices (Adolphs, 2001; Blakemore & Frith, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 
2003; Pinkham et al., 2003).  The amygdala, in particular, has been found to play an 
important role in responses to emotional stimuli, particularly in the identification of the 
emotional significance of stimuli in general (Adolphs et al., 1999; Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, & 
Tranel, 2002; Phillips, 2003), and negatively-valenced emotions in particular (Adolphs & 
Tranel, 2003).  Thus, it appears that certain neural structures show greater activation during 
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social cognitive than neurocognitive processing, which again, lends support for the relative 
distinction between these constructs (Phillips et al., 2003).   
    There is also evidence that performance on neurocognitive and social cognitive tasks is 
dissociable.  Specifically, Brunet and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that individuals with 
schizophrenia were able to complete sequences of physical causality, but not causality due to 
intentionality (ToM), thus highlighting the specificity of ToM deficits, rather than a general 
difficulty with linking causal events (Brunet et al., 2003).  Similarly, Cutting and Murphy 
(1981) asked participants questions about social information (i.e., social knowledge) and 
general knowledge, and discovered those with schizophrenia demonstrated the greatest 
impairment on the social knowledge task.   Similar dissociations can be found in individuals 
with brain damage and other neuropyschiatric disorders.  For example, individuals with 
frontal lobe damage (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Fine, Lumsden, & Blair, 2001) or prosopagnosia (Kanwisher, 2000) show 
significantly impaired performance in varying areas of social cognition such as ToM and 
facial processing, but have intact discrimination of other types of non-social stimuli.  In 
contrast, individuals with Williams’ syndrome tend to show a relative strength in social 
cognitive abilities, such as the detection of basic emotions from faces and normal 
performance on first-order ToM tasks (Jones et al., 2000), but have marked deficits in other 
aspects of neurocognition (Tager-Flusberg, Boshart, & Baron-Cohen, 1998; reviewed in 
Pinkham et al., 2003).   
    Third, there is only a modest association between neurocognition and social cognition in 
schizophrenia.  For example, affect recognition has been found to have a moderate 
relationship with various memory processes, as bivariate correlations range from .23 (Silver 
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& Shlomo, 2001) to .50 (Schneider et al., 1995), with several other studies supporting 
correlation estimates within this range (Bryson et al., 1997; Kohler et al., 2000; Sachs et al., 
2004).   However, the relationship between memory and another aspect of social cognition, 
ToM, has received equivocal support, with one study finding no relationship (Mazza et al., 
2001), and another suggesting memory accounts for 8% of the variance in ToM abilities 
(Greig, Bryson, & Bell, 2004).  Attention has shown a significant association with affect 
perception in some studies (r=.20 to .60; Bryson et al., 1997; Kee et al., 1998: Kohler et al., 
2000; Penn et al., 1993), but not others (Penn, Spaulding, Reed, & Sullivan, 1996).  
Furthermore, executive functioning or cognitive flexibility also had a modest relationship 
with affect perception in some studies (r=.29-.50; Kohler et al., 2000; Sachs et al., 2004; 
Schneider et al., 1995), but again, not in others (Penn et al., 1996).  In addition, there is no 
evidence of a significant relationship between executive functioning and social problem 
solving (Green, 1996) or ToM (Langdon et al., 2002; Mazza et al., 2001).  Moreover, verbal 
fluency has not been significantly related to ToM abilities (Schenkel, Spaulding, & 
Silverstein, 2005).  Finally, general cognitive functioning does not have a consistent 
relationship with social cognition; a neurocognitive composite accounted for 40% of the 
variance in social cue perception in one study (Lancaster Evans, Bond, & Lysaker, 2003), IQ 
was modestly related to social problem solving in another study (Bellack, Sayers, Mueser, & 
Bennett, 1994), and general neurocognitive ability was unrelated to affect perception in a 
third study (Silver & Shlomo, 2001).  Thus, the modest degree of shared variance between 
neurocognition and social cognition indicates non-overlapping constructs.   
    Fourth, there is evidence that neurocognition and social cognition make non-overlapping 
contributions to functional outcome in schizophrenia.  It is clear that social cognition has a 
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consistent relationship with functional outcome (Appelo et al., 1992; Brune, 2005a; Hooker 
& Park; 2002; Kee, Green, Mintz, & Brekke, 2003; Mueser et al., 1996; Penn, Ritchie, 
Francis, Combs, & Martin, 2002; Pinkham & Penn, in press; Toomey, Wallace, Corrigan, 
Schuldberg, & Green, 1997).  In fact, some studies have shown that social cognition has a 
stronger relationship with functional outcome than neurocognition (Penn et al., 1996; Pollice 
et al., 2002; Vauth et al., 2004).  Other studies have shown that the relationship between 
social cognition and functional outcome cannot be explained by neurocognitive factors 
(Corrigan & Toomey, 1995; Poole, Tobias, & Vinogradov, 2000), and that both domains 
appear to make an independent or equal contribution to functional outcomes (Addington, 
Saeedi, & Addington, 2005; Brune, 2005a; Roncone et al., 2002).  Therefore, the 
independent relationships of neurocognition or social cognition with functional outcome 
indicate that they represent relatively discrete domains. 
    Previous work examining the relationships among neurocognition, social cognition, and 
functional outcome is generally based on a “direct effects model,” which suggests that 
neurocognition and social cognition are correlated, yet relatively independent domains, with 
each having a unique relationship with functional outcome (see Figure 1, Appendix C).  
Much of the research in the foregoing discussion is consistent with this model, with several 
studies finding significant correlations among measures of social and neurocognition, and 
these domains both demonstrating a significant, non-overlapping relationship with functional 
outcome (e.g., Roncone et al., 2002).  However, none of these studies have assessed the 
utility of the direct effects model using a more advanced statistical modeling procedure; in 
fact, most have only used multiple regression or correlations in their investigations.  
Although these statistical approaches are informative, they are plagued by measurement 
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error, which can be quite high in some studies (e.g., Salem et al., 1996).  In addition, other 
statistical approaches do not allow modeling of the relationships among independent 
variables; a significant omission given that neurocognition and social cognition are often 
found to relate to one another.  Specifically, SEM helps address the problem of measurement 
error by estimating latent variables (i.e., latent or underlying constructs).  Latent variables are 
considered “free” from measurement error because they are comprised only of the covariance 
among the indicators (i.e., directly observed and measured variables like the Eyes test or 
verbal fluency).  Forming the underlying constructs in this manner allows the portion of 
variance from each indicator which is unassociated with the latent construct (of which 
measurement error is a major component) to be removed from the latent construct; thus, the 
relationships among latent constructs can be estimated without measurement error.  This is in 
contrast to regression, which assumes no measurement error (clearly always an incorrect 
assumption), without actually removing or separately modeling this error.  Thus, an approach 
allowing modeling of the relationships among the independent variables, as well as one 
which can address the issue of measurement error, is warranted to further explore the nature 
of the relationships among neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome.  
    A second model, the mediational model (see Figure 2, Appendix C), identifies social 
cognition to be a mediator between neurocognition and functional outcome (Green & 
Nuechterlein, 1999; Green et al., 2000; Kee et al., 1998; Penn, 1991; Penn et al., 1997).  
Green and colleagues have argued that the association between neurocognition and social 
cognition exists because intact neurocognitive abilities are requisite for normal social 
cognitive function (Green & Nuechterlein, 1999; Green et al., 2000; Kee et al., 1998).  
Indirect support for a mediational model is garnered from findings that neurocognition is 
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often impaired early in childhood in those at risk for developing schizophrenia (Cornblatt et 
al., 1999; Wolf, Cornblatt, Roberts, Shapiro, & Erlenmeyer, 2002), whereas there is little 
evidence, at this time, that deficits in social cognition precede the onset of psychosis (Penn et 
al., 1997; Pinkham et al., 2006).  Green and Penn have also argued that social cognitive 
abilities, such as emotion perception and ToM, appear to be necessary in order to interact 
normally with others, suggesting a mediational role for social cognition.  This highlights 
another advantage of SEM, namely it allows for testing of indirect effects (i.e., mediational 
effects) and total effects of independent variables.  Thus, in this context, it allows direct, 
statistical testing of the indirect effect neurocognition has on functional outcome, testing of 
the direct effect neurocognition has on functional outcome, and ascertainment of the total 
effect of neurocognition on functional outcome (both indirect and direct effects).  Although it 
does not allow a direct, statistical comparison of the mediational and direct effects models 
because they are not nested, it does allow direct testing of nested models, such as a 
mediational model with and without a direct effect of neurocognition on functional outcome 
(i.e., partial versus full mediation).  In addition, structural equation modeling has also been 
used effectively in other areas of schizophrenia research.  Specifically, the techniques of path 
analysis and structural equation modeling have been used in schizophrenia research to 
understand such diverse topics as pathways to relapse (Nuecterlein et al., 1992), patient 
attitudes toward treatment (Day, Bentall, & Roberts, 2005), risk factors for developing 
schizophrenia (Zhao, Liu, & Wang, 1995), the influence of expressed emotion in families on 
patients’ social adjustment (King & Dixon, 1996), and pathways to stigmatizing attitudes and 
behavior toward schizophrenia (Corrigan, Edwards, Green, Diwan, & Penn, 2001). 
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    Only a few studies have gone beyond multiple regression analyses to examine these issues.  
Vauth et al. (2004) used SEM to evaluate different models of the relationships among 
neurocognition, social cognition, and work functioning in schizophrenia.  They concluded 
that the mediational model provided a better explanation for the observed data than 
neurocognition or social cognition alone, and that the direct relationship between social 
cognition and work functioning appeared to be stronger than the direct relationship between 
neurocognition and work functioning.  Furthermore, a direct comparison between the 
generalized deficit model (i.e., neurocognition and social cognition were integrated into one 
construct) and the mediational model, yielded a significantly poorer fit with the observed 
data.  Thus, Vauth et al. found support for the possible superiority of a mediational model 
over the generalized deficit model in their sample.  Although they found substantiating 
evidence for the utility of the mediational model, they did not directly test the strength of the 
indirect (i.e., mediational) effect or examine the other model implied by the literature, the 
direct effects model.   
    Brekke, Kay, Kee, and Green, 2005 used path analysis to examine the relationships 
between a neurocognition composite, a social cognition composite (of 3 emotion perception 
tasks), reported social support, social skill, and functional outcome (as measured by 
subscales from the Role Functioning Scale (Goodman et al., 1993), assessing work, social 
functioning, and independent living).  The path from neurocognition to social skill was not 
significant, and the direct paths from neurocognition to functional outcome were not 
significant, so they were removed from the model.  Brekke and colleagues (2005) performed 
several separate path analyses, predicting the composite of functional outcome, as well as 
follow-up path analyses for the individual functional outcome subscales.  They found the 
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neurocognition composite had a significant indirect relationship with functional outcome via 
social cognition (i.e., a mediational relationship).  In addition, social cognition had a 
significant direct effect on functional outcome, as well as significant indirect effects through 
social skills and social support.  The same basic results were found for the individual 
domains of independent living, work functioning, and social functioning, with the exception 
of some of the indirect paths of social cognition to functional outcome (via social skill or 
social support) being insignificant depending on the functional outcome examined.  
Interestingly, these results generally held for functional outcome measured one year later, 
although the relationships were not quite as strong.  Brekke and colleagues (2005) argued 
these findings suggest that social cognition may need to be regarded as a central construct in 
understanding functional outcome.  
    Finally, Sergi et al (in press) used SEM to examine social perception as a mediator 
between early visual processing and functional outcome (using the Role Functioning Scale 
with the independent living skills, social functioning, and work functioning subscales).  Sergi 
et al. used the four subscales of the visual processing task to form a latent variable, and the 
subscales of the Role Functioning scale to form the latent construct for functional outcome.  
The latent construct of social cognition only had one indicator – the results on the social 
perception test.  Sergi et al. found evidence for a mediational relationship: the indirect effect 
of early visual processing on functional outcome was significant, as was its relationship with 
social perception; the model fit statistics were superior for the mediational model versus the 
basic model just incorporating early visual processing and functional outcome; and the direct 
effect of early visual processing on functional outcome was not significant.  Thus, these three 
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studies have begun to provide more direct support for social cognition serving as a mediator 
between neurocognition and functional outcome. 
    The primary aim of this dissertation was to examine the plausibility of the direct effects 
and mediational models in schizophrenia using SEM.  The proposed dissertation extends the 
results of Vauth et al. (2004), Brekke et al. (2005) and Sergi et al. (in press) in the following 
manner: 1) using a broader range of social cognition measures, which assess both emotion 
perception and ToM, to further investigate the plausibility of the mediational model; 2) 
evaluating a direct effects model, which has received some support in the literature, but was 
not assessed in the aforementioned studies (most compared the mediational model to a model 
just containing neurocognition and functional outcome); and, 3) utilizing a different, 
comprehensive measure of functional outcome, which encompasses such diverse areas as 
independent living skills, work functioning, and interpersonal communication.   
    In the ensuing section, I present background research relevant to the secondary aim of this 
dissertation: Are the structural relationships between neurocognition, social cognition, and 
functional outcome unique to schizophrenia or present in other groups with impairments in 
social cognition and/or social and community functioning? 
Evidence for Specificity of a Direct Effects Model in Schizophrenia 
    Much of the research examining the relationships among neurocognition, social cognition, 
and functional outcome has shown that the associations among these constructs differ across 
samples.  For example, Brune (2005a) found that none of the social cognition tasks correlated 
with neurocognition in the non-clinical control sample (i.e., individuals without a diagnosis 
of a mental illness), but that social cognition was significantly related to impaired 
neurocognition in the patient sample.  Similarly, other studies have provided evidence that 
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relationships between social cognition and neurocognition are significant in a schizophrenia 
sample, but not in a non-clinical (Addington & Addington, 1998; Corrigan & Toomey, 1995; 
Kohler et al., 2000; Penn, van der Does, Spaulding, Garbin, Linszen, & Dingemans, 1993; 
Toomey et al., 1997) or in a depressed sample (Penn et al., 1993).  As can be gleaned from 
the foregoing, most of the previous research has only assessed this differential pattern 
between a schizophrenia and a non-clinical sample; it does not address the issue of whether 
these findings are unique to schizophrenia or reflective of having a psychiatric disorder in 
general, having significant social impairments, or simply exhibiting greater variability in 
performance on social cognitive and functional outcome measures (than non-clinical controls 
might show).  One method for addressing this issue is to include a psychiatric control group 
(e.g., depression; Penn et al., 1993), but this controls for the presence of some symptoms 
(and to some extent, the experience of having a psychiatric disorder), but not social deficits, 
which have a stronger relationship with social cognition than symptoms do.  Therefore, an 
ideal comparison group might be one with core social deficits, similar to individuals with 
schizophrenia.  In the following section, I will highlight the value of employing a comparison 
group comprised of individuals with High-Functioning Autism (HFA) as a way of extending 
previous research in this area. 
Why Compare HFA and Schizophrenia? 
     A comparison group comprised of individuals who also experience significant and 
pervasive difficulties with social functioning would address the aforementioned gap in the 
literature and also provide a sample with greater variability in performance on 
neurocognitive, social cognitive, and functional outcome measures than non-clinical controls.  
A group of this nature would provide additional information about the specificity of these 
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deficits to schizophrenia and would help elucidate the underlying structure of these deficits in 
two groups with significant social dysfunction.  Thus, a comparison group of those diagnosed 
with HFA was added to this dissertation.  HFA provides a particularly unique and useful 
comparison given the similarities that exist between autism and schizophrenia (Bolte & 
Poutska, 2003; Konstantareas & Hewitt, 2001).  Three areas of research support the inclusion 
of a sample of individuals with HFA into the study: 1) evidence for intermediate phenotypes 
in relatives with autism similar to those with schizophrenia; 2) similar symptom presentations 
across disorders; and, 3) the two disorders share some similar deficits in neurocognition, 
social cognition, and functional outcome. 
    One supporting argument for comparing HFA and schizophrenia comes from studies of 
endophenotypes in schizophrenia or autism.  Specifically, similar phenotypic variants may be 
observed in relatives of those with schizophrenia as relatives of those with autism.  For 
example, one study found that a subset of those with childhood onset schizophrenia (which 
shows clinical and neurobiological links with adult onset schizophrenia; see Asarnow & 
Asarnow, 1994 and Nicolson & Rapoport, 1999) had marked features of pervasive 
developmental disorder.  Seventeen percent of the siblings of children from this subgroup 
met full criteria for autism, reflecting a total rate for the entire sample (4.9%) similar to those 
who have a sibling with autism (Sporn, Addington, Gostay, Ordonez, Gornick et al., 2004).  
In a study of Asperger’s syndrome, 15% of probands with Asperger’s had a relative with 
schizophrenia, a rate which is significantly higher than the general population (1%; 
Ghaziuddin, 2005).  In autism, the broad autism phenotype is characterized by aloofness, 
rigidity, anxiety, pragmatic and speech impairments, lower executive functioning abilities, 
and difficulties in interpersonal relations, such as in social and communication skills (Bishop, 
 34 
Maybery, Maley, Wong, Hill, & Hallmayer, 2004; Hughes, Leboyer, & Bouvard, 1997; 
Piven, 1999; Piven & Palmer, 1997; Yirmiya & Shaken, 2005).  Parents of those with autism 
are also less likely to have a large number of friends, and are less likely to have high quality 
friendships than parents of children with Down’s syndrome (Piven, Palmer, Landa, 
Santangelo, Jacobit, & Childress, 1997). In order to inform future work on the relationships 
between genes and behavior, as well as gene-brain-behavior relationships, a better 
understanding of how particular deficits underlie the defining features of these disorders is 
needed.  Specifically, social functioning deficits are a defining feature of both autism and 
schizophrenia, and thus attempts to understand how other observed deficits (i.e., in 
neurocognition and social cognition) contribute to this defining feature could help future 
studies in this area (Piven, 1999). 
    The two disorders share a number of symptoms in common, such as a lack of interest in 
social interaction, poor attention, and affective flattening (Konstantareas & Hewitt, 2001).  
Inpatients with schizophrenia have been found to exhibit autistic-like symptoms (Sheitman, 
Kraus, Bodfish, & Carmel, 2003), whereas individuals with autism have displayed features of 
thought disorder and poor reality testing typical of schizophrenia (Dykens, Volkmar, & 
Glick, 1991).  Another study found that half of the participants with autism also met criteria 
for schizophrenia (typically the disorganized subtype; Konstantareas & Hewitt, 2001).  
Along the same lines, Wolff (1995) claimed that it can be difficult to differentially diagnose 
HFA versus schizoid personality disorder, which may be present in first-degree relatives of 
individuals with schizophrenia.  Individuals with HFA (as opposed to autism) may serve as a 
better comparison group than autism in general, as they have IQs that are not in the mentally 
retarded range and have more normal language abilities like individuals with schizophrenia, 
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while still displaying significant social dysfunction (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 
2002).  
    Individuals with HFA share some overlapping neurocognitive impairments with 
schizophrenia.  For example, both groups are impaired in executive processing (Bolte, 
Rudolf, & Poustka, 2002; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997), verbal fluency (Kleinhans, 
Akshoomoff, & Delis, 2005), and psychomotor speed (Goldstein, Johnson, & Minshew, 
2001).  Indeed, Bolte and colleagues (2002) argued that those with schizophrenia or autism 
both tend to have neurocognitive impairments, and concluded that more convergent findings 
rather than discrepancies had been found thus far.  
    Studies of emotion perception in HFA also reveal similar deficits to those reported in 
schizophrenia.  Individuals with HFA have demonstrated impairments in the recognition of 
basic emotion relative to non-clinical controls (Capps, Yirmiya & Sigman, 1992; Celani, 
Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 2004; Loveland, et al., 
1997).  It also appears individuals with HFA perform best in perceiving happiness compared 
to other emotions (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997), consistent with findings from schizophrenia research.  
Furthermore, some studies have found that individuals with HFA exhibit deficits on some 
social cognitive tasks, while maintaining somewhat intact performance on similar 
neurocognitive tasks (Celani et al. 1999), consistent with the dissociation between 
neurocognition and social cognition observed in schizophrenia.  In addition, the moderate 
associations between executive functioning, verbal memory, or IQ and aspects of social 
cognition (e.g., theory of mind tasks, emotion perception) have also been found in autism 
(Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & Jan van der Gaag, 1999; Ozonoff, 
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Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).  Finally, individuals with HFA can perform normally on tasks 
of emotion perception with fewer choices (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Moritmore, & Robertson, 
1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), but appear to be 
significantly impaired on tasks with more choices or more dispositional judgments (Adolphs 
et al., 2001). Thus, it also appears necessary to include a variety of emotion perception 
measures in studies of HFA with varying cue sources and types of judgments, similar to what 
has been suggested in schizophrenia (Edwards et al., 2002). 
    Consistent with research on schizophrenia, ToM abilities are also deficient in individuals 
with HFA.  Individuals with autism typically perform poorly on ToM tasks (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), although some research suggests that individuals with HFA, 
in particular, may only be impaired on higher-order mental tasks rather than simpler tests of 
first-order ToM (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Capps et al., 1992; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Kaland, 
Moller-Nielsen, Callesen, Mortensen, Gottlieb, & Smith, 2002; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & 
Wheelwright, 2002), and sometimes even second-order ToM (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff et al., 
1991).  These findings are consistent with recent research in schizophrenia (Brune, 2005b).  
    Research also supports relatively poor functional outcome as being common in HFA, such 
as being unable to maintain employment in a competitive setting (i.e., not supported 
employment or workshop; Orsmond, Krauss, & Seltzer, 2004).  Furthermore, those with 
HFA have been found to have fewer friendships, and to display less interpersonal 
communication behaviors than same-aged, similar IQ peers (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2003; Bauminger, Shulman, & Agam, 2003). Corcoran et al. (1995) have argued that both 
groups exhibit social difficulties in childhood.  Indeed, social dysfunction is a defining 
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feature of HFA, as individuals must display sustained impairment in social interaction to 
receive the diagnosis, and often have difficulty with subtle aspects of social communication 
(APA, 2000). 
    The foregoing suggests that both groups share similar deficits in neurocognition, social 
cognition, and functional outcome.  However, the studies reviewed above did not directly 
compare individuals with HFA and those with schizophrenia.  Thus, in the ensuing section, I 
will review the few studies that have directly compared individuals with HFA and 
schizophrenia on these constructs. 
Direct Comparisons of HFA and Schizophrenia 
    Research directly comparing neurocognitive impairments in schizophrenia and HFA has 
generally been inconclusive about the relative performance of individuals with schizophrenia 
or HFA.  For example, Bolte et al. (2002) found that individuals with schizophrenia and HFA 
differed on their performance on two subtests of the Wechsler intelligence scale, with 
schizophrenia participants scoring better on Comprehension, and HFA participants obtaining 
better scores on Similarities.  Waterhouse and Fein (1984) found evidence for similar 
neurocognitive deficiencies in children with schizophrenia or autism, but found those with 
schizophrenia consistently scored higher than those with autism.  In contrast, Schneider and 
Asarnow (1987) found that the Wisconsin Card Sort and a task assessing visual search 
strategies were unable to satisfactorily differentiate individuals with HFA and schizophrenia.  
Thus, at the present time, it is unclear whether these groups differ in neurocognitive abilities. 
    Studies examining emotion perception in schizophrenia and autism have generally shown 
that individuals with HFA perform worse on tests of emotion recognition.  Specifically, Bolte 
and Poustka (2003) found that individuals with HFA performed significantly worse on 
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recognizing facial expressions of emotions than those with schizophrenia and normal 
controls.  This pattern of performance is not limited to the visual modality, as individuals 
with HFA have also shown greater impairments than individuals with schizophrenia and non-
clinical controls on an emotional prosody task (VanLancker, Cornelius, & Kreiman, 1989).   
    ToM abilities are deficient in both groups, with some limited evidence suggesting 
individuals with HFA perform worse than those with schizophrenia.  Specifically, children 
with schizophrenia or HFA performed significantly worse than normal controls on ToM 
tasks; and, although the HFA group appeared to perform worse than the schizophrenia group, 
the statistical comparisons were only significant on one of the ToM tasks (Pilowsky, 
Yirmiya, Arbelle, & Mozes, 2000).  Pickup and Frith (2001) did not directly compare those 
with schizophrenia and autism.  However, they used the same measures with their 
schizophrenia sample that are typically studied in autism.  They concluded individuals with 
autism performed substantially worse on their first- and second-order ToM tasks than 
schizophrenia participants.  Conversely, Craig et al. (2004) did not find evidence of greater 
ToM impairments in HFA, as they found that participants with paranoid delusions or 
individuals with Asperger’s syndrome were similarly deficient in their ToM abilities as 
compared to normal controls (Craig, Hatton, Craig, & Bentall, 2004).  In addition, another 
study of individuals with Asperger’s syndrome or schizophrenia and non-clinical controls 
found no evidence for overall group differences, although planned contrasts revealed those 
with schizophrenia performed significantly worse than controls, but no different than those 
with Asperger’s (Bowler, 1992). 
    Finally, one study compared social behavior in individuals with autism or schizophrenia 
with comorbid mental retardation, and concluded that while the groups are similarly deficient 
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in their social skills, the expression of these impairments varies by group (Matson, Mayville, 
Lott, Bielecki, & Logan, 2003).  Specifically, Matson et al. (2003) found individuals with 
psychosis or autism tended to perform worse than the control groups on assessments of their 
nonverbal social behavior.  Among inappropriate social behaviors, individuals with psychosis 
tended to perform more intrusive behaviors, such as following the staff around or 
inappropriately touching others, whereas those with autism tended to make more 
inappropriate verbal remarks.  However, another study found autistic children to be more 
impaired than psychotic children in language and social skills, although the psychotic sample 
had higher IQs (Matese, Matson, & Sevin, 1994).    
    Therefore, the foregoing indicates that few studies have directly compared individuals with 
HFA and schizophrenia in the domains of neurocognition, social cognition, and functional 
outcome.  There is some evidence, albeit limited, that individuals with HFA are more 
impaired in emotion perception and ToM relative to individuals with schizophrenia.  
Confident conclusions regarding group differences in neurocognition and functional outcome 
cannot be made at this time, however.  Finally, no study has directly compared these groups 
on neurocognitive, social cognitive, and social/community functioning abilities in the same 
study, nor has the relationship between neurocognition and social cognition with functional 
outcome been adequately assessed in HFA (Abdi & Sharma, 2004).  Accordingly, the second 
aim of the proposed dissertation was to examine whether the models of the associations 
among these constructs suggested by the literature in schizophrenia also fits the observed 
data from individuals with HFA.   
Aims of the Current Study 
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    The current dissertation aimed to address some of the limitations highlighted in the 
foregoing discussion.  First, I examined the nature of the relationships between 
neurocognition and social cognition with functional outcome in schizophrenia using 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).  SEM “is a comprehensive statistical approach to 
testing hypotheses about relations among observed and latent variables” (p.1; Hoyle, 1995) 
and was intended to examine two models indicated by the literature: 1) the direct effects 
model (Model A), i.e., neurocognition and social cognition make independent, influential 
contributions to functional outcome (Figure 1, Appendix C); and 2) the mediational model 
(Model B), i.e., social cognition mediates the relationship between neurocognition and 
functional outcome (Figure 2, Appendix C).  Although examination of the underlying 
structure of these constructs will be exploratory due to sample size constraints, using multiple 
measures of neurocognition and social cognition contributes to and extends previous research 
by allowing examination of latent constructs, which are free from measurement error.  This is 
a particular strength given the somewhat limited reliability of assessments, particularly of 
social cognition (e.g., Salem et al., 1996), which has been found previously.  SEM also 
allows modeling of relationships among the independent variables, which is a significant 
advantage over correlational or regression approaches. 
    The second aim of this dissertation was to ascertain whether the nature of the relationships 
among neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome in HFA adhere to the 
models suggested by the schizophrenia literature.  A multiple group comparison will be 
conducted within the SEM framework in order to achieve this aim. 
    Thus, the current study tested the following research questions: 1) how do the proposed 
models (the direct effects and mediational models) fit the data in the schizophrenia sample?  
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Is there evidence to support social cognition as a potential mediator between neurocognition 
and functional outcome in schizophrenia?  2) How do these models fit the data in an HFA 
sample?  Is there support for similar relationships among neurocognition, social cognition, 
and functional outcome in schizophrenia and HFA?   
    It was hypothesized that the indirect effect tested in Model B will be significant in the 
schizophrenia sample.  Findings indicating neurocognitive, but not social cognitive, 
impairments prior to illness onset (Cornblatt et al., 1999; Penn et al., 1997; Pinkham et al., 
2006; Wolf et al., 2002) provide theoretical support of a mediational relationship between 
these constructs.  Specifically, this research suggests neurocognitive abilities may influence 
the acquisition of social cognitive abilities, and because neurocognition is deficient, social 
cognitive abilities may be undermined (Green & Nuechterlein, 1999; Green et al., 2000).  
Indeed, Frith (1992) suggested those with schizophrenia may not exhibit pronounced deficits 
in theory of mind abilities until after illness onset and neurocognitive deterioration.  Social 
cognition also appears to have the most direct theoretical connection to social functioning, 
given the proximity between social cognitive abilities and social behavior, further supporting 
its role as a mediator (Green & Nuechterlein, 1999; Green et al., 2000).  In contrast, the 
indirect effect may not be significant in the HFA sample given findings that neurocognition 
and social cognition are impaired from infancy in individuals with autism (Charman et al., 
1998); therefore, the direct effects of neurocognition and social cognition may be stronger in 
the HFA sample. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Source of data for the current study 
    The proposed aims were accomplished through analysis of data from two grant-supported 
studies.  The first grant, entitled “A Neuropsychological Family Study of Autism and the 
BAP,” was funded by NIMH to examine the Broad Autism Phenotype (Joe Piven, M.D., 
Principal Investigator).  The second grant, the Autism-Schizophrenia Social Cognition Study, 
was funded by Johnson & Johnson to examine social cognitive functioning in individuals 
with schizophrenia, HFA, and non-clinical controls (David Penn, Ph.D., Principal 
Investigator). 
Design and Procedure   
    Data analyzed for the current study aims derive from a battery of neurocognitive and social 
cognitive tasks administered to individuals with HFA or schizophrenia.  Participants with 
HFA were recruited from the registry of families with member who has autism from the 
TEACCH center.  Participants with schizophrenia were recruited from the local outpatient 
clinic at UNC Hospitals as well as through other studies conducted in Penn’s research 
laboratory.  Before any study procedures were administered, all participants read and signed 
the consent form and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
authorization form (Appendix A), and discussed it with the experimenter to ensure they fully 
understood the procedures.  All individuals with autism must have met algorithm criteria of 
the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (Lord, Rutter, & LeCouteur, 1994) for autism.  
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Algorithm criteria are described further in the Measures section.  Diagnosis was confirmed 
through administration of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS-G; 
Lord, et al., 2000), which is described below.   
    The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
1995; described below) was used to diagnose all participants with schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder.  Diagnoses were confirmed by medical records whenever possible.  
All participant groups must have obtained a score of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for 
Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) of greater or equal to 70 to be eligible for study 
participation.  The minimum IQ score criterion ensures that all individuals with autism will 
be considered to have HFA.   
    Given the length of the assessment battery, participants were given the option of 
completing the assessment battery in 1 or 2 sessions.  The main battery and clinical 
interviewing were typically administered in 3-4 hours.  The autism group usually required a 
longer time frame, given the duration of the autism clinical assessments.  The majority of 
participants were tested in the laboratory at the University of North Carolina Psychology 
Department or the STAART Center.  If participants lived a significant distance from Chapel 
Hill, research assistants provided them with the option of being tested in their home.   
Measures 
    Measures are listed by the constructs they assess.  Most of the visual stimuli were 
presented on a computer monitor.  Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) were conducted on 
neurocognitive and social cognitive measures in order to assess whether they reliably assess 
the underlying factor, and thus, only a subset of the neurocognitive and social cognitive 
measures were included in the main analyses. 
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    Autism Diagnosis/Symptoms.  The Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord et 
al., 1994) is a semi-structured interview with the parent allowing assessment of information 
relevant to diagnosis.  The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS-G; 
Lord et al., 2000) is a structured observation designed to elicit social interaction and language 
use, which allows confirmation of  symptoms and multiple areas of functioning reported 
during the ADI-R.  Algorithms have been developed for the ADI-R to ascertain diagnosis 
and have been found to adequately discriminate between autism and mental-age matched, 
non-autistic controls (Lord et al., 1994).  The ADI-R requires approximately 2 hours to 
administer.  ADI-R algorithm cut-offs are at least greater than 10 for the social domain, and 
greater than 3 for repetitive behavior domains.  In addition, there are communication cutoffs 
of greater than 8 for verbal and greater than 7 if nonverbal.  The ADI-R is audiotaped and 
ADOS-G is videotaped in order to perform random reliability checks. 
    Schizophrenia Diagnosis/Symptoms.  The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 
I Diagnosis – Patient Version (SCID-P; First et al., 1995) was used to confirm diagnosis that 
was reported by the patient and documented in medical records.  It consists of a series of 
interview questions aimed at ascertaining past and present symptoms consistent with criteria 
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994).  
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987) was 
used to assess current levels of schizophrenia-related symptoms.  Participants answer 
questions in a brief (30 minute) semi-structured interview, which allows the examiner to rate 
their current symptom level.  Interviewers on both instruments were fully trained by Dr. Penn 
and have high reliability (ICC > .80). 
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    Neurocognitive Functioning.  Several constructs of neurocognitive functioning were 
assessed in this study and are described below. 
    IQ.  IQ was assessed for the purposes of establishing study eligibility criteria and to assess 
general intellectual functioning.  Participant groups were matched to the extent possible on 
IQ scores in order to equate groups on general cognitive ability.  The Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was chosen given that has a strong 
relationship to the full Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.  An abbreviated version was 
deemed necessary given the lengthy neuropsychological battery in order to reduce strain on 
research participants.  The two subtest version of the WASI, comprising the Vocabulary and 
Matrix Reasoning subtests, was used to estimate full scale IQ (FSIQ).  The two subtest 
version is highly correlated with full-scale IQ on the full Wechsler intelligence scale 
(Wechsler, 1999), and the subtests have high factor loadings on a general intelligence factor 
(Kaufman, 1994).   
    Verbal fluency.  Verbal fluency concerns the ability to generate words in response to 
verbal prompts, such as letters or categories (e.g., animals).  The Controlled Oral Word 
Association Test (COWAT; Benton, Hamsher, & Sivan, 1983) is a measure of a person's 
ability to generate words to specific letter prompts (i.e., C, F, and L).  Participants were given 
one minute to generate as many words as possible to a given letter excluding proper nouns 
and numbers.  The number of words was summed for each letter and a correction score was 
added to the total, taking years of education and age into account.   
    Visuoperceptual Ability.  This domain of neurocognitive functioning allows examination 
of whether participants have general deficits in their ability to process and accurately 
perceive visual stimuli.  The Benton Lines Test (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983) 
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is a well-established test of visual perceptual ability that requires participants to match the 
orientation of a target line with the orientation of another line from several choices.  The 
number of correct items was summed and added to a correction score taking age and gender 
into account. 
    Psychomotor Speed.  This domain assesses participants’ speed of processing while 
completing a motor task.  Trails A (from Trails A and B) requires participants to connect 
numbers in order as quickly as they can (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). Trails A has been used 
individually to effectively measure motor speed (Goldstein et al., 2001).  Individuals with 
schizophrenia (Bozikas et al., 2004; Green, 1996) and autism (Goldstein et al., 2001) 
typically show deficits in this area.  The amount of time taken to complete the measure was 
converted into a normative score based on the participants’ age, years of education, and 
gender. 
     Executive Function.  This construct encompasses many abilities, such as planful and 
sequential behavior, initiating and choosing behaviors, and cognitive flexibility (Duncan, 
1986).  Executive functioning was measured by Trail B (from Trails A and B), assesses the 
individual’s cognitive flexibility (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985).  In Trail B, participants 
alternately connect numbers and letters in order (e.g., 1 to A to 2 to B).  This type of 
cognitive flexibility has been shown to be deficient in autism (Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, 
& Filloux, 1994) and schizophrenia (Cools, Brouwer, deJong, & Slooff, 2000).  Performance 
was indexed as a normative score, using the time to complete the task in comparison to a 
similar age, years of education, and gender comparison group.   
    Social Cognition.  Social cognitive abilities in the areas of emotion perception and ToM 
were assessed and are described below. 
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    Emotion Perception.  Emotion perception abilities were assessed in three tasks: Point-
Light Motion Displays, Movie Stills, and the Trustworthiness Task. These tasks vary in the 
source of cues in the presented stimulus (still scenes, biological motion movies, still facial 
photos), as well as the type of judgment (choosing an emotion from five or seven choices 
versus making more dispositional social judgments of trustworthiness).   
    The Point-Light Motion Displays (Heberlein, Tranel, Damasio, & Adolphs, 2001) consist 
of a series of 22 short films (ranging 5 to 20 seconds) of an actor moving in ways that convey 
emotional information (e.g., dancing joyfully).  The short movies were filmed in the dark 
with lights on the major joints of the body and the head, and thus are a series of dots moving 
across the screen.  This allows no additional information to be garnered from the person’s 
facial expression, and therefore judgments are solely based on body movement.  As research 
has supported biological motion being a unique source of socially relevant information, it has 
been suggested that deficits in this area may have a variety of implications for social 
perception in general (Kim, Doop, Blake, & Park, 2005).  Participants were asked to choose 
one of five emotion words to describe “how the dots might be feeling”: happy, sad, afraid, 
angry, or neutral.  Performance is converted to accuracy scores on the basis of data from a 
reference group.  For example, if 100% of normal participants thought the answer was 
‘happy,’ and the participant said the response was ‘happy,’ they would earn a score of 1.0, or 
a zero for all other responses.  On the other hand, if 50% of normal participants said ‘angry,’ 
40% said ‘happy,’ and 10% said ‘afraid’ in response to the item, one would earn a score of 
1.0 for answering ‘angry,’ 0.8 for answering ‘happy,’ and 0.2 for answering ‘afraid.’  It has 
been argued that scoring the measure in this manner allows assessment of degrees of 
impairment related to a normal population rather than an absolute correct or incorrect score 
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(Majewska, Tranel, Damasio, & Adolphs, 2001).  Accuracy scores were summed and 
averaged to form two scales: accuracy on positive emotions and accuracy on negative 
emotions.   
    The Movie Stills task (Majewska et al., 2001) consists of 16 photographs of complex 
scenes from movies with clear emotional content.  The stimuli were chosen based on 
reliability data in a normative sample.  Participants were first shown the movie stills with the 
faces blocked out, then are re-shown the 16 photographs with the faces present.  Participants 
were required to choose one of the seven emotion words (happy, sad, afraid, surprised, angry, 
disgusted, or neutral) that best describe what the actors in the movie still are feeling.  
Performance was converted to accuracy scores on the basis of data from a reference group as 
described above for the Point-Light Displays.   
    Individuals with amygdala damage have demonstrated impaired performance on this task 
(Majewska et al., 2001).  When individuals with bilateral amygdala damage were 
administered the Movie Stills task, they demonstrated superior accuracy for scenes in which 
the faces were erased.  For fear, sadness, and particularly anger, those with bilateral 
amygdala damage benefited less from the presence of a facial expression for identifying 
emotion.  This pattern was present to a lesser extent in those with unilateral amygdala 
damage (Adolphs & Tranel, 2003).  Accuracy scores were summed and averaged to form two 
scales: accuracy on positive emotions and accuracy on negative emotions. 
    In the Abbreviated Trustworthiness Task (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998), 
participants are shown 42 faces of unfamiliar people and are asked to judge how much they 
would trust the person by providing a rating on a 7 point scale, ranging from -3 (very 
untrustworthy) to +3 (very trustworthy).  The photographs were carefully chosen in order to 
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maximize the variance in ratings given by normal participants.  This set of stimuli has been 
shown to discriminate individuals with bilateral amygdala damage from normal and other 
brain damaged participants (Adolphs et al., 2001).  Responses are converted to deviation 
scores by subtracting the normative response to each photo.  The most trustworthy and least 
trustworthy faces according to the normed scores were then used to form two scales: the 
average deviation on trustworthy faces and the average deviation on untrustworthy faces.  
This was then reverse-scored, so that higher scores reflected better performance in order to 
be consistent with the other measures. 
    ToM.  ToM was assessed with the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  Participants 
were shown a pair of eyes and asked to choose among four words the one that best describes 
what the person is thinking or feeling.  Although this task is different from the typical hinting 
or first- and second-order ToM tasks more commonly applied, it has been argued that it is a 
test of higher-order mental states (Adolphs et al., 2002).  A glossary is provided for 
participants in order to eliminate the effects of not understanding the meaning of the words 
used in the task.  The Eyes Task has been found to differentiate individuals with HFA from 
normal controls (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and is associated with activation of the amygdala 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).  The percentage of correct responses was used as a summary 
score for this measure. 
    Social Functioning.  Social Functioning was assessed with the Social Functioning Scale 
(SFS; Birchwood et al., 1990; see Appendix B).  The SFS is a self-report measure comprised 
of 74 items that are rated by the respondent on Likert and frequency scales.  It inquires about 
participants’ interpersonal functioning (e.g., friendships), prosocial behavior (e.g., helping 
others), recreational functioning (e.g., going to the movies), and occupational functioning 
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(e.g., searching for employment).  The SFS contains 7 subscales: social 
engagement/withdrawal, interpersonal communication/behavior, frequency of performing 
activities of daily living, competence at independent living, recreation, prosocial activities 
(common social activities such as sports), occupation/employment, which can also be 
summed to compute a total score (Birchwood et al., 1990).  Although the SFS has been used 
in a wide variety of studies within the schizophrenia literature, a limitation of the SFS is it 
has not been validated in a HFA sample.  This issue is addressed in the Discussion.  
Data Analytic Plan 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
    Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) were conducted prior to examining the structural 
models within SEM.  CFA and theory were used to choose the best indicators of each latent 
construct (i.e., neurocognition, social cognition), and to determine whether the subscales of 
the Social Functioning Scale are reliably measuring one construct.  The indicators, or 
observed variables, have been outlined above in the Methods section.  Latent constructs (or 
latent variables) are “unobserved variables implied by the covariances among two or more 
indicators,” and can be thought of as what the multiple indicators have in common with one 
another (p. 3, Hoyle, 1995).  
    As there are five indicators for neurocognition and seven indicators for social cognition, 
the reliability of each measure was examined carefully via examination of the R2 coefficients, 
which provide an estimate of the amount of variance in the indicator that is accounted for by 
the underlying construct.  All other variability is considered error.  Factor loadings were also 
examined in conjunction with the R2 coefficients to choose the most appropriate indicators.  
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These analyses were conducted with the entire sample, as the same indicators must be chosen 
for each group in order to compare models across groups.   
Structural Equation Model 
    First, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was chosen as the iterative procedure as it is 
the most commonly used estimation procedure in the field, and when the indicators are 
strongly related to the latent variables, ML has been shown to be a robust procedure to use 
with small sample sizes (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999).  It maximizes the 
probability that the observed covariances are drawn from a population assumed to be the 
same as the one estimated by the coefficients.  The free parameters are given values based on 
this procedure which minimize the values in the residual matrix (the resultant matrix from the 
comparison of the covariance matrix generated by the free parameters to the covariance 
matrix estimated by the observed data).  The maximum likelihood method of estimating 
missing data points using all available information from the data (referred to as Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood or FIML) was used, as this procedure has been found to 
have the least amount of bias in its estimated values (Arbuckle, 2000).    
    Second, the models were specified.  The direct effects model (Model A; see Figure 3, 
Appendix C) was specified as having an association (i.e., a correlational relationship) 
between the latent constructs of neurocognition and social cognition.  In turn, neurocognition 
and social cognition are both exogenous variables (i.e., there is no causal influence on them) 
with directional, influential relationships on functional outcome.  The mediational model 
(Model B; see Figure 4, Appendix C) has a directional relationship from the exogenous 
variable of neurocognition to social cognition, and another directional relationship from both 
neurocognition and social cognition to functional outcome.  In addition, the metric of the 
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underlying latent constructs must be set in order to produce a valid model with interpretable 
parameters.  The path between each latent variable and the indicator with the highest factor 
loading or reliability estimate (R2) was constrained as a fixed parameter with a value 1.0.  
Thus, three parameters, the path between each latent construct and its corresponding best 
indicator, was set at 1.0. 
    Because both models produced negative variances in both samples (see description in 
Results), the SEM approach was subsequently abandoned in favor of path analysis.  Path 
analysis still allows testing of multiple dependent relationships.  As such, it provides an 
opportunity to test mediation (as compared to a series of models which must be conducted 
for Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach in regression).  It also allows specification of 
correlational relationships among independent variables which is a significant advantage over 
a multiple regression approach. 
Path Analysis 
    The two models were specified within a path analysis framework by creating composites 
of neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome using the indicators chosen in 
the CFAs.  The fit indices and structural coefficients were examined for each model.  The 
chi-square (χ2) goodness-of-fit statistic is one of the most commonly-used statistical tests 
within this framework, and it indicates the degree of consistency between the pattern of fixed 
and free parameters and the pattern of variances and covariances in the observed data.  It 
tests the null hypothesis that the matrix estimated from the model parameters equals the 
observed data matrix.  It should not be significant if there is good model fit.  The 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
were examined, given that they tend to be the least biased indices in small samples (Hu & 
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Bentler, 1998).  Both indices use conventional cut-offs to indicate good model fit.  The 
model parameters, which provide information about the relationships among the latent 
variables, were also interpreted.  The standardized structural coefficients are the same as 
standardized regression weights, which facilitates interpretation.  However, because the 
model was then compared to another sample, unstandardized coefficients is preferred, as the 
standardized estimate does not take the different means and variances which may exist across 
groups into account (Byrne, 2001).  In addition, squared multiple correlations were obtained 
for each composite to acquire an estimate of the amount of variance explained by the other 
variables.   
    Comparison with HFA.  First, I tested the mean structure of the model across groups.  
Specifically, this comparison provides insight into whether the groups have significantly 
different means on the composites.  Second, I tested for invariant structural relations.  This 
procedure tests whether the relationships among the composites are the same in the 
schizophrenia and HFA samples.   
 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Demographic Characteristics 
    Demographic characteristics for both samples are displayed in Table 1 (Appendix C).  
There were no significant differences in education level, IQ, or gender.  However, 
individuals with schizophrenia were significantly older than those with HFA (t(75)=4.57, 
p<.001), and groups significantly differed on ethnicity (χ2(2, N=75)=7.77, p=.021), with the 
schizophrenia group having a higher proportion of African-American participants.  Neither of 
these variables were related to neurocognition, social cognition, or functional outcome. 
Introductory Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
    Preliminary CFAs were conducted on the constructs of neurocognition, social cognition, 
and functional outcome.  These analyses were conducted with the entire sample (HFA and 
schizophrenia) in order to facilitate comparing these constructs across both samples in the 
structural models.   
Neurocognition 
    Preliminary Models. The latent variable for neurocognition was first estimated by using all 
five indicators of neurocognition: verbal fluency, IQ, general perceptual ability, psychomotor 
speed, and executive functioning.  This model did not fit the data well, given the significant 
chi-square (χ2(5, N=79) = 27.37, p < .001), and unsatisfactory fit statistics (CFI = .741, 
RMSEA = .239).  Theory and the multiple correlation estimates were used to determine the 
next model.  Specifically, psychomotor speed is most conceptually different from the other
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four, and there are fewer studies supporting its association with functional outcome than the 
other indicators (Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000).  In addition, it had the lowest squared 
multiple correlation among the five constructs (r2 =.250).  Thus, psychomotor speed was 
eliminated from the model, and the CFA was tested again.   
    Final Model. The resultant model, with four indicators of neurocognition (verbal fluency, 
IQ, general perceptual ability and executive functioning) fit the data well, with a 
nonsignificant chi-square estimate (χ2(2, N=79) = 1.56, p=.457), and excellent fit indices 
(CFI=1.0, RMSEA < .001).  The squared multiple correlations were variable, with a high 
estimate for IQ (r2= .805) and lower, but comparable estimates for the other three indicators 
(executive functioning, r2=.323; verbal fluency, r2=.348; general perception, r2=.347).  
Although the estimates for three indicators appear low, this is consistent with the literature, 
which has shown IQ to account for a large proportion of the variance in neurocognitive 
ability with smaller contributions from other variables (Cohen et al., 2006; Pollice et al., 
2002).  In addition, the other estimates were similar in size and the model had excellent fit 
statistics; thus, this model was chosen as the most appropriate for the latent variable of 
neurocognition. 
Social Cognition 
    Preliminary Models. The latent construct for social cognition was again first estimated by 
including all seven indicators (point light positive and negative emotions, movie stills 
difference score [blanks minus faces] positive and negative emotions, trustworthy and 
untrustworthy faces, and the eyes test).  This model did not produce a solution because it had 
a negative variance.  I then attempted to reduce the number of indicators without losing all of 
the information from the variables themselves.  Thus, the variables comprising separate 
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scales for valence (i.e., positive versus negative emotions, trustworthy versus untrustworthy) 
were collapsed into a single measure.  Accordingly, the resultant model was comprised of 
four indicators: eyes test, point light total, movie stills difference score total, and 
trustworthiness total.  This model had a moderate fit with the data (χ2(2, N=79) = 2.18, 
p=.336, CFI=.992, RMSEA=.034).  Examination of the squared multiple correlations 
revealed the movie stills difference score was not loading on the underlying factor of social 
cognition (r2=.001).  Before eliminating this variable, it was deemed necessary to score it in a 
manner consistent with the other variables; that is, as an accuracy score rather than the 
difference between two accuracy scores.  Thus, it was computed as a total accuracy score 
(across valence and presence of faces).  A model with movie stills total, point light total, eyes 
test, and trustworthiness total as indicators produced a model with excellent fit statistics 
(χ2(2, N=79) =.732, p=.732, CFI=1.0, RMSEA< .001).  However, the squared multiple 
correlation for the trustworthy indicator was low (r2=.153).   
    Final Model. Given the low squared multiple correlation for the trustworthiness scale, a 
three indicator model eliminating the trustworthiness scale was estimated.  This model was 
also nonsignificant (χ2(13, N=79) = 10.19, p=.678) with excellent fit indices (CFI=1.0, 
RMSEA < .001), and with squared multiple correlation estimates more consistent with the 
neurocognition model (Eyes, r2=.690; Movie stills, r2=.301; Point light, r2=.345).  
Examination of these variables from both a statistical (i.e., bivariate correlations) and 
theoretical perspective did not yield potential sub-factors.  Consequently, the three indicator 
model appeared to be the most appropriate method for estimating the underlying construct of 
social cognition. 
Functional Outcome 
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    Preliminary Models. Consistent with the other latent constructs, the full model with all 
seven subscales of the SFS was specified first (independence competence, independence 
performance, social engagement, interpersonal communication, occupational functioning, 
prosocial activities, and recreation activities).  This model did not fit the data (χ2(14, N=79) = 
65.11, p<.001, CFI=.610, RMSEA=.216).  As one of the indicators had a squared multiple 
correlation estimate of zero (occupational functioning), it was eliminated, but this did not 
improve model fit.  Subsequently, a series of models were tested by eliminating the indicator 
with the lowest squared multiple correlation. 
    Final Model. A model with prosocial activities, recreation activities, and performance of 
independent living behaviors produced the best fit for the data (χ2(2, N=79)=3.40, p=.183, 
CFI=.978, RMSEA=.095), and these three indicators seemed to fit well together 
conceptually, as all measure frequency of behavior performance in different domains.  Thus, 
these three indicators produced a model of adequate fit for the construct of functional 
outcome. 
Structural Equation Modeling Analyses 
    These three measurement models were then used in the proposed structural models (See 
Figures 3 and 4, Appendix C) in order to test the study hypotheses.  However, both Model A 
(i.e., direct effects model) and B (i.e., mediational model) produced negative variances when 
tested in the schizophrenia and HFA samples.  As the most consistent negative variance 
occurred in the error variance for the prosocial scale, it was decided that functional outcome 
should be re-specified as an observed variable.  Thus, a composite of the standardized values 
for the three indicators of functional outcome (prosocial, recreation, and performance of 
independent behavior subscales) was created.  This composite replaced the latent variable for 
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functional outcome in both Model A and B.  However, negative variances were still obtained 
in the HFA sample in both the neurocognition and social cognition latent variables.  
Accordingly, it was decided that composites for neurocognition and social cognition should 
also be created.  These composites were then used to test the models within a path analysis 
framework (See Figures 5 and 6, Appendix C). 
Path Analyses 
    Schizophrenia Sample.  Models A and B and their corresponding nested models were 
tested in the schizophrenia sample.  The results are displayed in Table 2 (Appendix C).  The 
full model for both Models A and B is a saturated model, which results in the χ2 statistic and 
corresponding degrees of freedom to be equal to zero.  In addition, Model A and Model B are 
chi-square equivalent; thus, the fit statistics, parameter coefficients, and corresponding p-
values are equivalent for the two models, with two exceptions.  First, the parameter estimate 
for the path between neurocognition and social cognition differ, as it is specified as a 
correlation in Model A, but a regression path in Model B.  Second, an indirect effect is 
estimated in Model B for the indirect (i.e., mediational) impact of neurocognition on 
functional outcome via social cognition.  Thus, the main results for these two models will be 
discussed together. 
    The coefficient for the relationship between social cognition and functional outcome is 
positive, and can be interpreted as a regression coefficient (i.e., for every one unit increase in 
social cognition, there is a .275 unit increase in functional outcome).  However, it should be 
noted this coefficient is not significant in the full model.  A significant, but negative direct 
relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome was found in both Model A and 
B (β=-.318, p=.024).  In contrast, the indirect effect of neurocognition on functional outcome 
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was positive (β=.133, p=.028), and this caused the total effect of neurocognition on 
functional outcome to be lower than its direct effect in Model B (β=-.185, p=.069).  Finally, 
the estimates of the relationship between neurocognition and social cognition were 
significant and positive for both Model A and Model B (β=4.56 and .486, respectively). 
    Examination of the nested models revealed that removing the relationship between 
neurocognition and social cognition (path a, p<.001) or the relationship between 
neurocognition and functional outcome (path b, p=.028) resulted in significantly poorer fit 
statistics for the model.  Removing the path between social cognition and functional outcome 
did not result in significantly poorer fit (path c, p=.152), but it did reduce the strength of the 
relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome (β=-.185, p=.090) and the 
amount of variance in functional outcome accounted for by the model (10.4% versus 6.1%; 
Table 3, Appendix C).  These results suggest that the full Models A and B appear to explain 
the data better than the nested models (i.e., removing any of the proposed relationships in 
these models results in poorer fit).   
    In sum, the findings described above indicate a significant and negative relationship 
between neurocognition and functional outcome, a weak, positive relationship between social 
cognition and functional outcome, and a possible mediational effect of neurocognition on 
functional outcome via social cognition. 
    Test of Model A and B with Latent Variables.  Within the schizophrenia sample, it was 
possible to maintain latent variables for the constructs of neurocognition and social 
cognition.  Because of the aforementioned problems with measurement error with the social 
cognition instruments in particular, Models A and B were examined with latent variables 
specified for neurocognition and social cognition for the purpose of comparison with the path 
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analysis.  Again, these models are χ2 equivalent, thus the fit statistics, regression coefficients, 
and corresponding p-values are the same for both models, with the exception of the 
relationship between neurocognition and social cognition, and estimates of the indirect and 
total effects within Model B.   
    The same general pattern of findings emerges with this approach (Table 4, Appendix C).  
Social cognition, consistent with the path models, has a positive, but nonsignificant 
relationship with functional outcome.  The direct relationship between neurocognition and 
functional outcome is negative, but nonsignificant within these models.  Consistent with the 
path models, the indirect effect of neurocognition on functional outcome is positive (β=1.96, 
p=.277), and the total effect of neurocognition on functional outcome is thereby reduced (β=-
.590, p=.136).  Estimates of the relationship between neurocognition and social cognition are 
positive and significant within both models, but the amount of variance in social cognition 
explained by neurocognition appears to be greater with the latent variables compared to the 
composite variables (42.7% versus 81.0%; Table 3, Appendix C).  Thus, the same general 
pattern of findings is observed in the latent models as the path models: 1) there is a negative 
relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome; 2) there is a positive 
relationship between social cognition and functional outcome; and, 3) the indirect effect of 
neurocognition on functional outcome via social cognition is positive.  However, in the latent 
models, the coefficients for the direct and indirect effects for neurocognition are not 
significant. 
    HFA Sample.  As the nested models were not suggestive of better fit than the full models, 
the schizophrenia and HFA groups were compared on the full Models A and B only (Table 2, 
Appendix C).  Examination of the coefficients revealed somewhat different estimates than in 
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the schizophrenia sample.  The relationship between social cognition and functional outcome 
was nonsignificant and negative (β=-.199, p=.355), whereas the direct relationship between 
neurocognition and functional outcome was nonsignificant and positive (β=.171, p=.397).  
The indirect relationship in Model B between neurocognition and functional outcome was 
quite small and negative in the HFA sample (β=-.083, p=.113).  In addition, the amount of 
variance in functional outcome accounted for by the models in the HFA sample appears 
smaller than that accounted for in the schizophrenia sample (Table 3).  Conversely, the 
relationship between neurocognition and social cognition was significant and positive in both 
Models A and B, which was consistent with the models in the schizophrenia sample.  Despite 
apparent differences, tests of structural invariance in both models revealed the two samples to 
have equivalent structural relationships in Model A (p=.120) and Model B (p=.209).  The 
two groups also did not differ on the means of the composites (p=.213).   
    The two approaches used to compare schizophrenia and HFA on these models yield 
inconsistent results.  First, inspection of the parameter coefficients across the two samples 
leads to the following conclusions: 1) the relationship between neurocognition and functional 
outcome is positive and nonsignificant in HFA in contrast to a negative and significant 
relationship in the schizophrenia sample; 2) the relationship between social cognition and 
functional outcome is negative and nonsignificant, whereas this relationship is positive and 
nonsignificant in the schizophrenia sample; 3) the indirect (i.e., mediational) effect of 
neurocognition on functional outcome via social cognition is small and negative in HFA, in 
contrast to a significant and positive mediational effect in schizophrenia; and, 4) substantially 
less variance in functional outcome is accounted for in HFA versus schizophrenia.  The 
second approach for comparing schizophrenia and HFA involved statistically comparing the 
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structural relationships (i.e., paths) across groups.  This approach indicates the schizophrenia 
and HFA samples do not differ in any of the relationships among constructs.    
Supplemental Analyses 
    Given the unexpected negative relationship between neurocognition and functional 
outcome, as well as the finding that little variance was explained in functional outcome by 
either neuro- or social cognition, some additional analyses were performed.  Specifically, 
correlations among the composite variables, as well as the constituent measures which 
comprise these constructs, were examined in both samples.   
    Correlations among the composites revealed a similar pattern of findings as that observed 
within the path models.  Specifically, positive and strong relationships were observed 
between neurocognition and social cognition composites in both samples (see Table 5, 
Appendix C).  This relationship appears to be weaker in the HFA sample, which is supported 
by fewer significant associations between specific measures of neurocognition and social 
cognition within HFA (Table 6, Appendix C).  
    A weak non-significant negative relationship was found between neurocognition and 
functional outcome in the schizophrenia sample, whereas no association was observed 
between these constructs in the HFA sample (Table 5).  A weak, non-significant negative 
relationship between social cognition and functional outcome was found in the HFA sample, 
compared to no association in the schizophrenia sample.  These findings are supported by the 
individual relationships between specific measures of neuro- and social cognition with the 
three subscales comprising functional outcome (Table 7, Appendix C).  Again, these 
correlational relationships, particularly among the composites, replicate the relationships 
suggested by the regression coefficients observed in the path models.  
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
    The primary aim of this dissertation was to explore two models that described the 
relationships among neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome in 
schizophrenia and HFA.  Consistent with expectations, a strong positive relationship was 
found between neurocognition and social cognition in both models and both samples.  
However, contrary to hypotheses, little variance in functional outcome was accounted for by 
the models in either sample.  Modest support was found for a mediational relationship 
between neurocognition and functional outcome via social cognition within the schizophrenia 
sample, although contrary to expectations, the direct relationship between neurocognition and 
functional outcome was negative.  There was little support for significant relationships 
between neurocognition or social cognition with functional outcome in the HFA sample.  
These findings, and my interpretation of them, are discussed below. 
    Consistent with previous work in schizophrenia, a strong relationship between 
neurocognition and social cognition was found in both the schizophrenia and HFA samples.  
Within schizophrenia, neurocognition accounted for 42.7% of the variance in social 
cognition in the path model and 80% of the variance in the SEM model, which is suggestive 
of a large (but not complete) amount of overlap between these constructs.   This finding is 
consistent with previous studies, particularly those that examined the relationship between 
composites or latent variables (Brekke et al., 2005; Sergi et al., in press; Vauth et al., 2004). 
It also lends support, to some extent, for evidence that deficits in social cognition in
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schizophrenia are partially accounted for by a generalized performance deficit (discussed in 
Penn et al., 1997). 
    Although neurocognition accounted for a large proportion of the variance in social 
cognition in the HFA sample as well (20%), this relationship is considerably smaller than 
that observed in the schizophrenia sample.  As there have been no studies, to my knowledge, 
examining the association between neurocognition and social cognition in HFA, it is difficult 
to compare these findings to previous research in this area.  However, these findings suggest 
that neurocognition and social cognition are relatively independent in autism, or at least 
among individuals with HFA, underscoring the notion that social cognitive deficits are a core 
feature of autism. 
    Contrary to hypotheses, relatively little variance was accounted for in functional outcome 
by the models in the group with schizophrenia.  In other studies using similar methodologies 
and analytic procedures, approximately 18-25% of the variance in functional outcome was 
explained by neurocognition and social cognition (Brekke et al., 2005; Sergi et al., in press, 
Vauth et al., 2004), which is about twice the amount of variance accounted for in this study.  
There was evidence, however, that the indirect relationship of neurocognition on functional 
outcome via social cognition was positive, which is consistent with the hypothesis that social 
cognition is an important mediating factor (Brekke et al., 2005; Sergi et al., in press; Vauth et 
al., 2004).  
    Within HFA, neither social cognition nor neurocognition demonstrated a significant direct 
relationship with functional outcome, nor did social cognition serve as a mediator of the 
relationship between neurocognition and outcome.  These findings were confirmed by the 
lack of significant correlational relationships between the composites or specific measures 
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among these constructs.  Although this pattern differs from that observed in the 
schizophrenia sample, the group comparison analyses did not support different structural 
relationships between HFA and schizophrenia.  However, this is likely a result of the limited 
statistical power in the current study, as the χ2 statistic is particularly sensitive to sample size 
(Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999; Hu & Bentler, 1995). 
    One unexpected finding was the significant negative relationship between neurocognition 
and functional outcome in the schizophrenia sample.  As there was no support for outliers 
underlying this negative relationship, alternate explanations were considered.  It is possible 
that poor neurocognitive functioning limits one’s ability to self-reflect and report on one’s 
own behavior on the SFS, which is a self-report instrument.  Thus, those with deficient 
neurocognitive abilities may over-report their actual behaviors, perhaps due to memory 
difficulties.  Alternately, this negative relationship could be an artifact of the three subscales 
used in the analyses, as examination of the relationship between neurocognition and the other 
subscales revealed no relationship between these variables rather than a negative one.  
However, the three subscales included in the analyses do not appear markedly different from 
other functional outcome measures used in schizophrenia research, particularly those 
evaluating community involvement or self-care skills.  It is also possible that an unobserved 
confounding variable was responsible for this unexpected relationship.  As null or 
unpredicted findings are difficult to explain, there may be multiple reasons and 
interpretations for these results.  Thus, the preceding points are necessarily speculative in 
nature. 
    Since the findings regarding the relationship between neurocognition and social cognition 
replicate previous research, but the lack of functional significance of these domains does not, 
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it is possible that the null findings may be due to problems with how functional outcome was 
assessed.  In previous research using similar analytic techniques, Sergi et al. (in press) and 
Brekke et al. (2005) used the Role Functioning Scale (Goodman et al., 1993), an interviewer-
rated assessment of social relationships, independent living skills, and work functioning, and 
Vauth et al. (2004) used the Work Personality Profile (Bolton & Roessler, 1986) which is 
comprised of ratings by job coaches of social skills and personal presentation at work.  Thus, 
the most salient difference between these studies and the current dissertation is that they used 
interview-based assessments of functional outcome, while this study relied on self-report.  
Therefore, as noted above, self-report may be problematic, and should be supplemented with 
additional measures of functional outcome (Dickerson, 1997).  Such multiple measures 
should not only include interview-based assessments, but also performance-based 
evaluations, such as role plays.  In fact, performance based assessments might provide the 
most theoretically relevant link to neurocognition and social cognition in that they assess 
whether individuals are capable of performing certain behaviors in specific situations 
(McKibbin, Brekke, Sires, Jeste, & Patterson, 2004).  Broader based domains of functional 
outcome (e.g., recreational functioning) are not always strongly related to performance based 
assessments (Cohen et al., 2006; Dickerson et al., 2000; Penn et al., 1995) and in addition, 
they may be influenced by factors outside the individual’s control, such as level of social 
support, financial means, personal resources (e.g., having an automobile), etc. (Brekke et al., 
2005). 
    It is also possible that exploring the relationships between neurocognition, social cognition 
and functional outcome can be explained by other factors.  Specifically, the relationships 
between neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome may be reflective of a 
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shared underlying mechanism (e.g., brain or genetic abnormalities).  A more powerful 
approach may be to directly examine brain-behavior relationships (i.e., relate social behavior 
directly to brain abnormalities), rather than assessing the relationship between behavior and 
“surface-level” deficits which are a byproduct of neural abnormalities (i.e., the relationship 
between functional outcome and neurocognition).  Thus, future work might consider 
evaluating the relationship between neural activity and volume with functional outcomes, or 
to consider to the causal paths between pathophysiology, domains of cognition, and 
functional outcome.   
Study Limitations 
    As discussed above, the primary limitation for this study was possibly the use of the SFS.  
This may be particularly the case for the participants with HFA, as the SFS has not been 
validated in this clinical group (although the reliability estimates for the SFS was generally 
very good for this group in the present study).   However, it should be noted that the 
psychometric properties of the SFS have been well-established in schizophrenia (Birchwood 
et al., 1990; Dickerson et al., 1997), and that some researchers believe that more objective 
indicators such as frequency of behaviors (as measured in the SFS) may be especially 
appropriate for disorders like schizophrenia (Kee et al., 2003).  It is also possible that the 
battery used to assess neurocognition and social cognition could have been bolstered by 
additional measures that have shown a strong association with functional outcomes, such as 
memory (Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000).  Within the domain of social cognition, many of 
the measures used in the current study have not been validated in schizophrenia, and the 
measure most consistently associated with functional outcome, facial affect perception, was 
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not part of the battery.  Thus, the inclusion of a facial affect perception task may have 
allowed for a better comparison with previous research in the area. 
    Finally, as noted earlier, the small sample size of both samples in this dissertation may 
have limited the ability to detect effects (Fan et al., 1999; Hu & Bentler, 1995).  In addition, 
the small sample size precluded use of the proposed SEM analyses in favor of path analysis 
given problems encountered with negative variances. 
Conclusions 
    This dissertation aimed to explore two models of the relationships among neurocognition, 
social cognition, and functional outcome in schizophrenia and HFA.  This project sought to 
extend previous research by assessing both a direct effects and a mediational model, and by 
examining across two clinical samples.  The findings support a strong relationship between 
neurocognition and social cognition in both samples, particularly for the schizophrenia 
group.  The relationships between neurocognition and social cognition with functional 
outcome were inconsistent with previous studies, which may be explained in part by 
measurement issues associated with the SFS.  Modest support was found for social cognition 
serving as a mediator between neurocognition and functional outcome in the schizophrenia 
sample, which is consistent with previous research in this area.  Although the groups did not 
have significantly different structural relationships among these variables, the regression 
estimates and the correlational structure support the possibility of differing strength of 
relationships among these constructs in HFA versus schizophrenia.   
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APPENDIX A 
CONSENT FORM FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA PARTICIPANTS 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT 
CHAPEL HILL 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
February 24, 2005 
 
Social Cognition and Social Functioning in Autism 
and Schizophrenia 
(Schizophrenia version) 
 
Principal Investigator:  David L. Penn, Ph.D. 
    UNC-CH Department of Psychology 
    Davie Hall, CB #3270 
    Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3270 
    dpenn@email.unc.edu 
    (919) 843-7514 
 
Co-Investigators: Joe Piven, M.D., Kevin Pelphrey, Ph.D., Shannon M. Couture, M.A., 
and Diana Perkins, M.D. 
   
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  The person listed above is in charge 
of the study; other people may help him or act for him. 
 
Your participation is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or decide to leave the study at 
any point and for any reason without affecting the treatment that you’ve been receiving prior 
to this study. 
 
Details about this study are discussed below.  It is important that you understand this 
information so that you can decide in an informed manner whether you want to participate.  
You are encouraged to ask Dr. Penn or any staff that may be assisting him, any questions that 
you have about the study at any time. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to compare the cognitive (e.g., memory skills), social cognitive 
(e.g., ability to identify others’ emotions), and social skills of persons with autism, 
schizophrenia, or no history of either disorder. 
 
How many people will participate in this study? 
70 
This study is part of a broader project of 100 individuals.  For this study, 40 individuals with 
schizophrenia and/or schizoaffective disorder and 30 individuals without schizophrenia 
and/or schizoaffective disorder will participate. 
 
How long will your participation last? 
You will be asked to complete a battery of tasks that will last approximately 3 - 4 hours.  You 
can complete these tasks over one or two meetings. 
  
What will happen if you take part in the study? 
This is what will happen during the study: 
 
1. You will be interviewed about your current and past symptoms, as well as current and 
past drug/alcohol use.  All information pertaining to this interview will be strictly 
confidential.  Also, we may review your charts or talk to your physician regarding the 
following information: Diagnosis, medications, and history of psychiatric 
hospitalizations.  We will also ask you for information pertaining to: Age, ethnicity, 
years of education, and marital status. 
2. You will complete a battery of tasks.  These tasks involve three different areas: 
Cognitive skills, social-cognitive skills, and social functioning.  Cognitive tasks 
assess memory, attention, and problem solving skills.  Social-cognitive tasks assess 
the ability to perceive and make sense of one’s own and others’ behavior.  For the 
social functioning assessment, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. 
3. We are also interested in how you view some of the social scenes in this study.  For 
these tests, you will sit in a chair and view various faces and other social objects on a 
computer screen.  To test how you look at the objects, we will measure your eye 
movements by recording tiny reflections of light in your eyes as you look at different 
parts of the pictures.  The procedure also involves videotaping your eye and part of 
your face to make sure we are tracking your eye properly.  No one except for the 
study coordinators will ever see this videotape. 
4. For your participation in this study, you will receive $12.50/hour.  If you decide to 
withdraw from the study before it is completed, your compensation will be pro-rated 
(at 15 minute intervals).  This prorating of compensation will also apply if it is 
determined that you do not meet any of the study criteria (after signing the consent 
form). 
5. Also, if available, we will gather information regarding your most recent diagnostic 
interview and symptom assessment from the following studies: Efficacy and 
Tolerability of Olanzapine, Quetiapine, and Risperidone in the Treatment of First 
Episode Psychosis: A Randomized Double Blind 52 Week Comparison (IRB# 02-
PSYCH-7), Brain MRI/MRS Changes in First Episode of Schizophrenia (IRB# 
GCRC1890), and Adherence, Coping, and Education (ACE) Therapy: Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy for First Episode Schizophrenia (IRB# 00-PSYCH-381).  This 
information will only be available to Dr. Penn and members of his research staff. 
 
Are there any reasons you should not participate? 
You should not participate in this study if you are under 18 or older than 45 years of age, do 
not have a diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, and have shown 
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problematic drug or alcohol use in the past three months (e.g., using drugs and alcohol in 
excess, having difficulty stopping drug and alcohol use, using drugs and alcohol in risky 
situations such as driving a car, and needing greater amounts of the drug or alcohol to get the 
desired effect). 
 
What are the possible risks or discomforts? 
We are not aware of any risks that this study poses to you.  During the measurement of your 
eye movements, you will be asked to put your chin in a chin rest.  You may remove your 
chin from the chin rest in between tasks if you find this uncomfortable 
 
What are the possible benefits of participating in the study? 
From this study, we hope to learn about the similarities and differences in cognitive, social-
cognitive, and social functioning between persons with autism and schizophrenia. 
 
How will your privacy be protected? 
No specific individuals will be identified in any report or publication about this study. 
All materials will be kept in locked cabinets, and will only be accessible to the investigators 
listed above and trained research assistants.  Any identifying information (i.e., name) will be 
recorded on a separate list from your data.  A master set of identification numbers will be 
kept in a separate location in a locked file cabinet away from any identifying information.  
 
What if you have questions about the study? 
If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact the principal investigator listed at the 
beginning of this consent form.  If you have any questions about your rights as a participant 
in this research, you may also contact the UNC-Chapel Hill Academic Affairs Institutional 
Review Board at (919) 962-7761 or aa-irb@unc.edu. 
 
PARTICIPANT’S AGREEMENT: 
I have read the information provided above, the study has been explained to me, and my 
questions have been answered.  I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.  I understand 
that I may leave the study at any time without affecting any treatment I'm currently receiving.  
I have also been given a copy of this form for my records. 
 
_________________________  ___________________________________ 
Date      Participant’s Signature 
_________________________  ___________________________________ 
Date      Participant’s Printed Name 
_________________________  ____________________________________ 
Date      Signature of Person Obtaining Consent 
_________________________  ____________________________________ 
Date      Printed Name of Person Obtaining Consent 
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HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA PARTICIPANTS 
 
HIPAA Authorization for Use and Disclosure of Health Information for Research 
Purposes 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
 
IRB Study # PSYC 05-016 
UNC-Chapel Hill Principal Investigator (Researcher): David Penn, Ph.D. Department of 
Psychology, Davie Hall, CB#3270, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, 
NC 27599-3270 
 
Co-Investigators: Joe Piven, M.D., Kevin Pelphrey, Ph.D., Shannon Couture, M.A., and 
Diana Perkins, M.D. 
 
Sponsor: Johnson and Johnson Corporation 
 
This is a permission called a “HIPAA authorization.”  It is required by “The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996” (known as “HIPAA”) for us to get information 
from your medical records or health insurance records to use in this research study. 
  
 
1. If you sign this HIPAA authorization form you are giving your permission for the 
following people or groups to give the researchers certain health information about you: 
UNC Hospitals, Department of Psychiatry 
Carramore 
OPC Mental Health Center 
 
2. If you sign this HIPAA authorization form, this is the health information about you that the 
people or groups listed in #1 may give to the researchers to use in this research study:    
 
Diagnosis, medications, current and past alcohol and drug use, age, ethnicity, gender, 
education, social functioning history, and history of psychiatric hospitalizations 
 
3. The people or groups listed in #1 may give this health information to the researcher listed 
at the top of this form (UNC-Chapel Hill Principal Investigator) or to another researcher 
working on this research study. 
 
4. The health information you allow the researchers to get may be seen or used by people 
who do not have to follow HIPAA rules.  You can ask the researchers any questions you 
have about how they will protect your personal information in this research study.  
 
5. If you do not sign this HIPAA authorization form you cannot be in this research study, but 
if you do not sign this HIPAA authorization form the people or groups listed in #1 will not 
change your right to treatment, payment, enrollment or eligibility for anything that is not part 
of this research study just because you did not sign this HIPAA authorization form.  
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6. This HIPAA authorization will stop at the conclusion of the study. 
 
7. You have the right to stop this HIPAA authorization at any time.  HIPAA rules are that 
you must stop this HIPAA authorization in writing.  You may give your written stop of this 
HIPAA authorization directly to the people or groups listed in #1 or you may give it to the 
researcher and tell the researcher to send it to any person or group the researcher has given a 
copy of this HIPAA authorization.  Stopping this HIPAA authorization will not stop 
information sharing that has already happened. 
 
8.  You will be given a copy of this signed HIPAA authorization. 
 
 
___________________________________   _________ 
Signature of Research Subject  Date 
 
___________________________________ 
Print Name of Research Subject 
 
For Personal Representative of the Research Participant (if applicable) 
 
Print Name of Personal Representative: ___________________________ 
Please explain your authority to act on behalf of this Research Subject: 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I am giving this permission by signing this HIPAA Authorization on behalf of the Research 
Participant. 
 
___________________________________  _________ 
Signature of Personal Representative  Date 
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CONSENT FORM FOR HFA PARTICIPANTS 
 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study  
A1   Adult with Autism  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Medical IRB Study: 02-PSYCH-284 
Consent Form Version Date: April 5, 2005 
 
Title of Study: Family Study: The Neuropsychological Basis of Autism 
 
Principal Investigator: Joseph Piven, M.D. 
UNC-CH Department: Psychiatry 
Phone number: (919) 843-8641 
 
Co-Investigators: Ralph Adolphs, Ph.D. (University of Iowa), Francesca Happé, Ph.D. 
(Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College, University of London), David Penn, Ph.D. 
(University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill) and Marcia Van Riper, Ph.D., R.N. (University of 
North Carolina-Chapel Hill) 
 
Sponsor: National Institutes of Health 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. The investigators listed above are in 
charge of the study; other professional persons may help them or act for them. 
 
What are some general things you should know about research studies? 
 
Research studies are designed to gain scientific knowledge that may help other people in the 
future. You may or may not receive any direct benefit from participating. There may also be 
risks associated with participating in research studies. 
 
Your participation is voluntary.  You may refuse to participate, or you may withdraw your 
consent at any time, and for any reason, without jeopardizing your future care at this 
institution or your relationship with your doctor.  If you are a patient with an illness, you do 
not have to participate in research in order to receive treatment. 
 
Details about this particular study are discussed below.  It is important that you understand 
this information so that you can decide in a free and informed manner whether you want to 
participate.  You will be given a copy of this consent form.  You are urged to ask the 
investigators named above, or staff members who may assist them, any questions you have 
about this study at any time. 
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What is the purpose of this study? 
 
The broad autism phenotype (BAP) is defined by characteristics (or traits) that are much 
milder but qualitatively similar to the defining features of autism. By examining these mild 
characteristics we hope to discover behavioral, language and/or learning trends among family 
members of individuals with autism that might give us important information in discovering 
what might cause autism, including possible genetic causes.  
 
In this project we propose to examine individuals with autism and some of their relatives as 
well as relatives of individuals with Down syndrome and individuals with no developmental 
disability in their family on selected neuropsychological (brain, learning and thinking) 
measures of social understanding, central coherence and executive function.  These are three 
principal cognitive (learning) frameworks that have been suggested as ways to explain the 
neuropsychological basis of autism.  These neuropsychological characteristics will be looked 
at in relationship to our clinically-based interview measures of the broad autism phenotype.  
We hope that in doing this we will learn more about the neuropsychological profile of 
relatives of people with autism.  We also want to see how the neuropsychological profiles of 
people with autism look compared to individuals with no developmental disability in their 
family. We may then be able to use this information in future medical, educational and 
therapeutic research of autism.  Individuals with autism and their relatives as well as relatives 
of individuals with Down syndrome and individuals with no developmental disability in their 
family will be compared in these three thinking and learning areas, to a unique sample of 
individuals with injuries to specific parts of the brain. We know how certain parts of the 
brain typically work and we know certain tests that tap into the skills stored in those brain 
areas.  Because of this, we hope that comparing test results from people who have known 
damage to these areas (for example, someone who had a part of their brain damaged from an 
accident) to test results from people in different groups might give us a better idea of how 
that area of the brain is working in individuals with autism and their family members.  
Additionally, we will look for patterns of these characteristics in individuals and families. 
 
 This research has potential importance in several areas.  If we are able to see certain trends 
in multiple families in behavior, learning and language we may be able to use the information 
to help look for genes that may contribute to causing autism.  Additionally, by looking at the 
results from tests that examine how certain areas of the brain work we might be able to learn 
more about what areas of the brain in individuals who have autism are working as would be 
expected and the areas that are not working typically.  Finally, by getting specific 
information about the most subtle ways that autism appears, we may be able to expand our 
understanding of autism spectrum disorders.  This expanded knowledge may ultimately lead 
to better detection, educational and treatment methods.  
 
We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you have a diagnosis of 
autism. 
 
How many subjects will participate in this study? 
A total of approximately 85 individuals with autism and 180 relatives of individuals with 
autism (i.e. fathers, mothers and siblings) as well as 60 relatives of people with Down 
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syndrome  (i.e. fathers, mothers, and siblings) and 55 people without a developmental 
disability will participate in this study. 
 
What will happen if you take part in the study?   How long will your participation last? 
 
Because this study involves your parents they will need to agree to participate too.  Before 
you participate in this study you should ask your parents if they would be willing to learn 
more about the study.  We would be happy to talk with them about the study and what their 
participation would entail.  They will be doing many of the same activities and tests as you 
will be doing. We would also ask that they give us some information about you as a young 
person.  They will have to sign their own consents and may drop out of the study at any time. 
Your specific test results will not be shared with them and their results will not be shared 
with you. 
 
If your parents do not want to be in this study then we will not include you in this study.  
With your permission, we will keep your name on file as a possible participant for other 
studies.  You do not have to be in any other studies. 
 If you and your parents decide to take part in this study, the following will occur: 
 
First, we will need to interview you to get some basic information about you and your family 
(approximately 30 minutes).  We will ask to get some of your medical and educational 
records.  These records will be used to provide information about your diagnosis, cognitive 
function and general medical history, including specific genetic testing that you may have 
had done in the past. The forms allowing us to access those records will take about 30 
minutes to complete. We will have your parents complete a questionnaire about you 
describing you as a child and what you are like now.  It takes about 30 minutes to complete.    
 
After this is complete, we will then schedule a time with your parents to do a detailed 
interview about your development and behavior.  The interview takes about 2 hours to 
complete. This is the first step that will help us determine where you are in the wide range of 
autism spectrum disorders. It is called the screening testing. We are looking for a sample of 
this broad range, so that the individuals in our study are very similar to each other. We may 
determine at this point that you do not fit in that group. In that case, you will be finished with 
participating in the study and you will not complete any more testing.  
 
For our next task with you, if you fit in the group we are looking for, we will then make an 
appointment with you to begin testing at a time convenient to you. We will begin with a 
“warm up” period in which you get to know the person doing the testing.  Then, we will 
begin the cognitive testing and structured interview.  The testing will involve looking at 
pictures, books, and videos.  We will also ask you to solve some problems involving blocks, 
pictures, and lines.  Additionally we will test for your understanding of certain words and 
concepts. We will talk with you about a variety of subjects (interests, friends, school/job and 
so on). Some individuals may complete the testing at this point and will be done with the 
study. This will complete the screening testing. 
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 Next we will schedule an appointment to complete the cognitive testing. This session will 
also begin with a “warm up” period in which you get to know the person doing the testing. 
The testing will involve solving some problems with blocks, pictures, lines, faces and rings. 
You will do some of the testing looking at a computer screen at faces, videos and other 
pictures. We will ask you to complete some sentences and name some words. While you are 
looking at the computer screen, we will be recording your eye movements on video. To do 
this, you will wear a device like a baseball cap that will illuminate your eye. The device may 
seem unusual to you but poses no known risk and has been used with infants. We will also 
ask you some questions about your style of relating to other people. Finally, we will conduct 
a brief physical examination.  We will look at your hands, skins, arms, legs and face.  This 
examination should not hurt.  All parts of the assessment can be done in two or three days for 
a total of six hours.  We can split up the testing so you can do your best job on each activity.  
The cognitive tests and structured play/interview will examine learning styles, intelligence, 
and social understanding. Breaks will be taken throughout testing procedures.   Additionally, 
the person doing the testing will be specially trained in conducting these tests with people 
with autism.  Testing sessions will be videotaped.  Videotaped material will allow us to 
assess how participants complete certain tasks.  For example, we will watch how a person’s 
eyes move while looking at pictures.  Additionally, the tapes will be reviewed by the study 
director to be sure that the same procedures are being used with each participant.     
 
All testing and interviews can be completed at your home or in our offices on the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill campus. 
 
Are there any reasons you should not participate? 
 
You should not participate in this study if any of the following apply:  you have a known 
medical condition associated with autism (i.e., Fragile X syndrome or tuberous sclerosis) or 
known central nervous system injury (e.g., cerebral palsy). 
 
What are the possible risks or discomforts? 
 
People sometimes feel tired or uncomfortable during testing. Any person that feels fatigued, 
tired, uncomfortable, or in any way upset during any of the sessions, may ask to stop for a 
rest break or have testing discontinued. The eye-scanning device may feel unusual or 
different to wear and time will be given for you to get used to it or ask questions about it. 
 
The interview being given is not, and does not take the place of, a full psychiatric evaluation.  
If any particular question makes you uncomfortable, you may discuss its importance with the 
researcher.  You may choose not to answer any question with which you still feel 
uncomfortable. 
 
If you tell your family doctor that your family has participated in this study, or if you tell 
your doctor about any specific aspects relating to your participation, this information may 
then become part of your medical record with this doctor.  Insurance companies routinely 
have access to such records.  An insurance company might consider participation in a family 
study an indication of higher risk because it implies that there is a family history of a genetic 
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condition.  This might then hurt your family’s access to health or other insurance.  This is a 
risk for the entire family, nuclear and extended, and not just a risk for the individual with 
autism. We will not release information about you or your family to your doctor unless you 
authorize us to do so.  
 
In addition, there may be uncommon or previously unrecognized risks that might occur. 
 
What are the possible benefits of participating? 
 
You will not receive any direct benefit from this project, but individuals who might develop 
autism their family members, and future generations may benefit from knowledge gained as 
part of this study.  We do not want any potential volunteer to think that this research project 
offers any form of treatment.  We hope that our research will make a significant contribution 
to the rapidly increasing literature on autism.  This knowledge provides a framework for 
more effective educational programs, medical treatment and forms a basis for a more 
complete understanding of the assets, as well as difficulties, found in people with 
developmental disorders. The people who take part in research make an invaluable 
contribution to furthering our understanding of these conditions.  
 
We do not expect to discover any information of direct clinical relevance to the condition or 
treatment during the next few years.  If later on, diagnostic tests or new ways to treat the 
condition are discovered, this information should be obtained from properly licensed clinical 
labs or clinics, and will not come from the research team. 
 
Subjects and their families will receive results of the study through a family newsletter, and 
individual feedback will be given upon request.  
 
What if we learn about new risks? 
 
Any new information that may make you change your mind about being in this study will be 
given to you, as it becomes available. 
 
How will your private information be protected? 
 
Records of all participation in this research project will be maintained and kept confidential 
and will not be released without your prior written authorization. 
 
Any information we get from this study about you including your identity will be kept 
confidential.  We will take the following steps to ensure confidentiality.  A research number 
will be assigned to you and your name will not be used. A linkage file joining the code with a 
name will be maintained in a secure location, accessible only to researchers working on this 
study.   The results from the interviews and testing will not be released or shared in any way 
with your relatives, with insurance companies, or any third party not involved in research 
unless you request that we do so in writing. Remember, however, that if you tell your 
physician that you are participating in a family study of autism, that fact might make it into 
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the medical record and, hence, to insurance companies. When results of this study are 
published, your name will not be used. 
 
Video and audio materials will be generated during the course of this study.  These records 
will be used for “blind” rating information by other members of the research team.  Blind 
rating means that the person watching or listening to the tape does not know anything about 
your family.  We will also use the tapes to learn about the way your eyes move when looking 
at pictures. The tapes will be stored at the University of North Carolina in the same manner 
as all other data, in locked research files by an assigned identification number.  The tapes will 
be maintained as a permanent part of your study file and will not be destroyed unless you 
request.   
 
The information you provide us for this research study will be sent to one of the National 
Institute of Health’s funded data collection centers, along with all the data gathered in this 
research project. The information will continue to be kept confidential and protected and will 
not be shared with anyone not involved in research. Other researchers may have access to 
this data, but none of the information will include your name or identifying information. The 
UNC STAART (Studies To Advance Autism Research and Treatment) Center, of which our 
research group is part, will be the only place where your name and identifying information 
will be kept. 
 
You may be contacted during the study and in the future about other research projects.  Dr. 
Piven may not be the Principal Investigator of those studies but may agree to distribute 
information for another investigator.  Your name will not be disclosed to any other 
investigator unless you request after learning about the study.  You are not obligated to 
participate in other studies conducted by Dr. Piven or any other investigator. 
 
Will it cost you anything if you participate? 
 
You will not be charged for any tests that are being performed for the purposes of this study. 
There will be no costs to you, especially if we come to your home, if you decide to 
participate.  
 
If during the course of testing we determine that you have a condition for which we 
recommend treatment or follow-up a referral will be made.  You or your insurance company 
will be responsible for paying for testing/services received outside of this research project. 
 
Will you be paid for participating? 
 
You will receive $30 for completing the screening testing, and your parent will receive $30 
for completing the interview that is part of the screening. 
 
You will be paid $50 for completion of the study.  If you withdraw before your part in the 
study is complete or are withdrawn by the Principal Investigator you will be paid based on 
the amount of direct testing that was completed.   
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Who is sponsoring this study? 
 
This research is funded by the National Institutes of Health.  This means that the research 
team is being compensated by the sponsor for conducting this study.  The researchers do not, 
however, hold a direct financial interest in the sponsor. 
 
What if you want to stop before your participation in the study is complete? 
 
You can withdraw from this study at any time, without penalty.  The investigators also have 
the right to stop your participation at any time. Withdrawal may include the destruction of all 
tapes and records if you wish. 
 
All participation is voluntary. There is no penalty to anyone who decides not to participate.  
Nor will anyone be penalized if he or she decides to stop participation at any time during the 
research project.  
 
What if you have questions about this study? 
 
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about this 
research. If you have further questions you should call Joseph Piven, M.D. at (919) 843-8641 
or (800) 793-5715. 
 
What if you have questions about your rights as a subject? 
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Committee on the Protection of the 
Rights of Human Subjects (Medical IRB) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
If your family has any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a research subject, 
please contact the Chairman of the Committee at (919) 966-1344.  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Subject’s Agreement: 
 
I have read the information provided above. I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.  
 
________________________     ________________ 
Signature of Research Subject    Date 
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HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR HFA PARTICIPANTS 
 
ADDENDUM TO CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATING IN A RESEARCH 
STUDY (HIPAA Authorization for use of Protected Health Information) 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IRB Study Number: 02-PSYCH-284 
Version Date of This Form: April 5, 2005   
 
Title of Study: Family Study: The Neuropsychological Basis of Autism 
 
Principal Investigator: Joseph Piven, M.D. 
UNC-CH Department: Psychiatry 
Mailing Address: Campus Box 3366 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel 
Hill NC 27599-3366 
 
Co-Investigators: Ralph Adolphs, PhD (University of Iowa), Francesca Happe PhD 
(Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College, University of London), David Penn, Ph.D. 
(University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill) and Marcia Van Riper, Ph.D., R.N. (University of 
North Carolina-Chapel Hill) 
 
Sponsor: National Institute of Health 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is the purpose of this form? 
You have been asked to take part in a research study.  The consent form for this study 
describes your participation, and that information still applies. This extra form is required by 
the federal “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act” (HIPAA).  The purpose is 
to get your permission (authorization) to use health information about you that is created by 
or used in connection with the research.  If you are signing on behalf of someone other than 
yourself, this permission applies to that person’s health records.  
 
What if I don’t want my personal health information to be used in this research study? 
You may refuse to give this permission.  A decision not to sign this form will not change 
your ability to get health care outside of this research study.  However, you may not be able 
to participate in this research study unless you sign this permission form.  You should discuss 
this, and any other questions, with the investigators. 
 
Who will be allowed to use my personal health information for this research? And why? 
The investigators named above and their assistants will be allowed to see and to use your 
health information for this research study.   We may use it to check on your progress during 
the study, or analyze it along with information from all other subjects.  Sometimes research 
information is shared with collaborators at other institutions, or with labs running additional 
tests.  Your records may also be reviewed by other employees of the University of North 
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Carolina at Chapel Hill, representatives of the research sponsor or funding agency, or by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in order to check for quality and safety. 
 
What personal health information am I allowing to be used for this research study? 
The information we might use includes:  Information contained in your medical records that 
relates to diagnoses made, results of lab tests or psychological tests, interviews and office or 
hospital visits as well as x-ray and other imaging reports. 
 
Where will investigators go to find my personal health information? 
We may ask to see your personal information in records at hospitals, clinics or doctor’s 
offices where you have received care in the past, including but not limited to facilities in the 
UNC Health Care System.  Based on what we know at this time, the places we will seek 
access to your records include: 
________________________________________________________________________                              
 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
What are the privacy protections for my health information used in this research 
study?  
The federal privacy regulations (HIPAA) apply to personal health information in the records 
of health care providers and other groups that share such information. There are some 
differences in how these regulations apply to research, as opposed to regular health care.  
One difference is that you may not be able to look at your own records that relate to this 
research study, at least until the study is over. The HIPAA privacy protections may no longer 
apply, once your personal health information has been shared with others who may be 
involved in this research.  
 
How long does this permission allow my personal health information to be used? 
If you decide to be in this research study, your permission to access and use your health 
information in this study will not expire, unless you revoke or cancel it.  Otherwise, we will 
use your information as long as it is needed for the study. 
 
What if I change my mind after I give this permission? 
You have the right to cancel this permission to use your personal health information for 
research.  In this case, we will not get any more of your health information for use in this 
research.  However, canceling this authorization will not reverse uses of your personal health 
information that have already happened, or uses that have already been promised and cannot 
reasonably be reversed. If you want to cancel this permission, you must put this in writing 
and deliver to the Principal Investigator at the mailing address listed at the top of this form.  
You should clearly state that you want to cancel this permission to use your personal health 
information in this particular research study (attaching a copy of this form would be very 
helpful). 
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SUBJECT’S AUTHORIZATION 
I have read the information provided above.  By signing this form, I am giving permission for 
my personal health information to be used in research as described above.  I will be given a 
copy of this authorization form after I have signed it. 
 
____________________________ __________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Research Subject Signature    Date 
(or Authorized Representative*) 
         
____________________________ __________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Person  Signature     Date 
Obtaining Authorization 
 
*Only if consent/authorization by someone other than immediate subject was approved by 
IRB.  If used, also include description of Representative’s relationship to subject, and their 
authority to act on subject’s behalf (parent, legal guardian, etc).    IRB Version 3-7-03 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SOCIAL FUNCTIONING SCALE 
 
This questionnaire asks you about various social activities that you may have engaged in over 
the past one month.  Please circle the appropriate response.  Please choose only one response 
for each question.  
                   
  1.   What time do you get up on the average weekday?   
o Before 9am           
o 9 – 11am           
o 11am – 1pm          
o After 1pm          
         
   2.  How many hours of the day do you spend alone (e.g. alone in a room, walking out  
        alone, listening to the radio or watching TV alone, etc.)? 
o 0-3 hours (very little time spent alone)      
o 3-6 hours (some of the time)        
o 6-9 hours (quite a lot of the time)       
o 9-12 hours (A great deal of the time)       
o 12 or greater hours (Practically all of the time)    
 
  3.   How often will you start a conversation at home? 
o Almost never          
o Rarely           
o Sometimes         
o Often           
 
  4.   How often do you leave the house (for any reason)? 
o Almost never          
o Rarely           
o Sometimes          
o Often           
 
  5.   How do you react to the presence of strangers (Please choose only one      
        response)? 
o Avoid them          
o Feel nervous          
o Accept them          
o Like them      
 
6)  How many friends do you have at the moment?  (people who you see regularly,  
     do activities with, etc.) 
o No friends          
o One friend          
o Two friends          
85 
o Three or more friends   
       
7)  Do you have a boy / girlfriend or are you married? 
o Yes           
o No           
 
 8).    How often are you able to carry out a sensible or rational conversation? 
o Almost never          
o Rarely          
o Sometimes         
o Often           
 
 9)  How easy or difficult do you find it talking to people at the moment? 
o Very easy          
o Quite easy         
o Average          
o Quite difficult         
o Very difficult          
 
Please use the scale below to answer the following questions.  Place the number of the 
response in the blank space provided to indicate how often you have done the following 
things in the past month. 
 
          Never               Rarely               Sometimes               Often 
    0                       1                           2                           3 
 
10.   Bought items from stores (without help).     ______ 
 
11.   Washing pots, tidying up, etc.                  ______ 
 
12.   Taking regular showers and baths.      ______ 
 
13.   Washing own clothes.                   ______ 
 
14.   Looking for a job (if unemployed; if employed enter 3 in blank).  ______ 
 
15.   Doing food shopping.        ______ 
 
16.   Preparing and cooking a meal.       ______ 
  
17.   Leaving the house alone.       ______ 
 
Please use the scale below to answer the following questions.  Place the number of the 
response in the blank space provided to indicate how often you have done the following 
things in the past month. 
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          Never               Rarely               Sometimes               Often 
    0                       1                           2                           3 
 
18.   Using buses, trains, cars, etc.                 ______ 
   
19.   Using money.         ______ 
 
20.   Budgeting.         ______ 
 
21.   Choosing and buying clothes for self.                 ______ 
 
22.   Taking care of personal appearance.                 ______ 
 
23.   Playing musical instruments.       ______ 
 
24.   Sewing, knitting.         ______ 
 
25.   Gardening, growing plants.       ______ 
 
26.   Reading books or magazines.                 ______ 
 
27.   Watching television.        ______ 
 
28.   Listening to CDs, tapes, or the radio.                 ______ 
   
29.   Cooking.                     ______ 
 
30.   Home “handyman” projects.       ______ 
 
31.   Fixing things (care, bike, household materials, etc.).    ______ 
 
32.   Walking, hiking, running.       ______ 
 
33.   Driving or cycling (biking) for recreation.     ______ 
 
34.   Swimming.         ______ 
 
35.   Hobby (e.g., collecting things)                  ______ 
 
36.  Shopping for recreation.        ______ 
 
Please use the scale below to answer the following questions.  Place the number of the 
response in the blank space provided to indicate how often you have done the following 
things in the past month. 
 
          Never               Rarely               Sometimes               Often 
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    0                       1                           2                           3 
 
37.   Artistic activities (painting, crafts, etc.).     ______ 
 
38.   Going to the movies.        ______ 
 
39.   Going to the theater or to a concert.                 ______ 
 
40.   Watching an indoor sport (basketball, ice hockey).               ______ 
  
41.   Watching an outdoor sport (football, soccer).                ______ 
 
42.   Visiting an art gallery or museum.      ______ 
 
43.   Visiting an exhibition or fair.       ______ 
 
44.   Visiting places of interest/tourist attractions.               ______ 
 
45.   Going to meetings, talks, lectures, etc.      ______ 
 
46.   Attending an evening class.       ______ 
 
47.   Visiting relatives in their homes.      ______ 
 
48.   Being visited by relatives.       ______ 
 
48.   Visiting friends (including boy / girlfriend).      ______ 
 
50.   Playing a musical instrument.                  ______ 
   
51.   Going to a party.         ______ 
 
52.   Attending formal occasions.       ______ 
 
53.   Going to a dance club.           ______ 
  
54.   Going to a bar.         ______ 
 
55.   Playing an indoor sport (e.g., basketball, ice hockey).    ______ 
 
56.   Playing an outdoor sport (e.g., football, baseball).               ______ 
 
Please use the scale below to answer the following questions.  Place the number of the 
response in the blank space provided to indicate how often you have done the following 
things in the past month. 
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          Never               Rarely               Sometimes               Often 
    0                       1                           2                           3 
 
57.   Gone to a club/society meeting (e.g., gardening club).    ______ 
 
58.   Eating out in a restaurant.       ______ 
 
59.   Going to a coffee shop.        ______ 
  
60.  Going to a church or temple activity.      ______ 
 
When answering the following questions, consider how able you are at doing the following 
activities.  In other words, can you do the activity by yourself or do you need help?  Use the 
scale below to answer the following questions.  “Adequately” means you can do the activity 
without help; “Need help” means you can do the activity with help from other people; 
“Unable” means you cannot do the activity, even if you have help from others; “Not known” 
means you have never done the activity or do not know if you can. 
 
 Not known               Unable               Need help               Adequately 
        0        1                          2                                3 
 
 
61.   Use public transportation (bus, train)                _____ 
 
62.   Handling money.        _____ 
 
63.   Budgeting.         _____ 
 
64.   Cooking for self.         _____ 
 
65.   Weekly food shopping.                  _____ 
 
66.   Looking for a job (put 3 in the blank if you are employed).             _____ 
 
67.   Washing own clothes.        _____ 
 
68.   Personal hygiene.        _____ 
 
69.   Cleaning, tidying, etc.        _____ 
 
When answering the following questions, consider how able you are at doing the following 
activities.  In other words, can you do the activity by yourself or do you need help?  Use the 
scale below to answer the following questions.  “Adequately” means you can do the activity 
without help; “Need help” means you can do the activity with help from other people; 
“Unable” means you cannot do the activity, even if you have help from others; “Not known” 
means you have never done the activity or do not know if you can. 
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 Not known               Unable               Need help               Adequately 
        0        1                          2                                3 
 
70.   Buying things from stores.       _____ 
 
71.   Leaving the house alone.       _____ 
 
72.   Choosing and buying clothes.                 _____ 
  
73.   Caring for personal appearance.       _____ 
 
74.   Please circle the option that best describes your current employment: 
 
o Full time student           
o Part time student           
o Employed full time (40 hours per week)        
o Employed part time (10-35 hours per week)         
o Employed in industrial therapy, rehabilitation, or retraining courses.    
o Stay at home mom or dad.          
o Unemployed          
 
75.  If unemployed or not in school, have you had a job or been enrolled in school within the 
last six months? 
o Yes            
o No             
 
76.  If unemployed, how often do you make attempts to find a new job? 
o Almost never          
o Rarely           
o Sometimes          
o Often           
 
77.  If you have not been employed for six months or more, do you think you are 
         capable of some sort of employment? 
o Definitely Yes          
o Would have difficulty        
o Definitely No  
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Table 1.  Demographic Characteristics 
Mean (SD) Schizophrenia HFA 
Age* 27.5 (6.3) 21.0 (5.9) 
Years of Education 13.1 (2.5) 12.4 (2.0) 
IQ 98.0 (16.6) 102.9 (17.7) 
   
% (Count)   
Gender (male) 88.9% (40) 81.8% (27) 
Ethnicity*   
   Caucasian 71.1% (32) 96.7% (29) 
   African-American 26.7% (12) 3.3% (1) 
   Other 2.2% (1) 0% (0) 
Note. HFA=High-Functioning Autism; *p<.05. 
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Table 2. Path Analysis Results for Model A and B for Schizophrenia and HFA Samples 
 Model Fit 
Schizophrenia χ2 df p CFI RMSEA   
Full Model A 0 0 N/A 1.00 <.001   
   a=0, no covariation 24.5 1 <.001 .108 .731   
   b=0, no NC→FO 4.84 1 .028 .854 .295   
   c=0, no SC→FO 2.06 1 .152 .960 .155   
Full Model B 0 0 N/A 1.00 <.001   
   a=0, no mediation 24.5 1 <.001 .108 .731   
   b=0, no NC→FO 4.84 1 .028 .854 .295   
   c=0, no SC→FO 2.06 1 .152 .960 .155   
HFA        
Full Model A 0 0 N/A 1.00 <.001   
Full Model B 0 0 N/A 1.00 <.001   
                                   Parameter Estimates 
Schizophrenia SC↔NC p SC→FO p NC→FO p  
Full Model A 4.56 <.001 .275 .147 -.318 .024  
   a=0, no covariation N/A  .275 .055 -.318 .003  
   b=0, no NC→FO 4.56 <.001 -.005 .972 N/A   
   c=0, no SC→FO 4.56 <.001 N/A  -.185 .090  
HFA        
Full Model A 2.46 .019 -.199 .367 .171 .405  
Schizophrenia NC→SC p SC→FO p NC→FO p Ind NC→FO 
Full Model B .486 <.001 .275 .147 -.318 .024 .133 
   a=0, no mediation N/A  .275 .055 -.318 .003 N/A 
   b=0, no NC→FO .486 <.001 -.005 .972 N/A  -.003 
   c=0, no SC→FO .486 <.001 N/A  -.185 .090 N/A 
HFA        
Full Model B 2.46 .019 -.199 .367 .171 .405 -.083 
Note. CFI=Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA=Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation, SC=Social 
Cognition, NC=Neurocognition, FO=Functional Outcome, Ind=Indirect Effect, HFA=High-
Functioning Autism. 
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Table 3. Magnitude of Variance Accounted for by Models. 
 
Schizophrenia-Path model  
Model A 
Variance in FO 
Model B 
Variance in FO 
Model B 
Variance in SC 
   Full model 10.4% 10.4% 42.7% 
   No NC/SC relationship 22.3% 22.3% N/A 
   No NC→FO path 0% 0% 42.7% 
   No SC→FO path 6.1% 6.1% 42.7% 
    
Schizophrenia-LV model    
   Full model 17.8% 17.8% 81.0% 
   No NC/SC relationship 22.5% 22.5% N/A 
   No NC→FO path 2.2% 2.2% 81.8% 
   No SC→FO path 3.6% 3.6% 77.8% 
    
HFA-path model    
   Full model 3.3% 3.3% 20.0% 
Note. NC=Neurocognition, SC=Social Cognition, FO=Functional Outcome, LV=Latent 
Variable. 
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Table 4. Latent Variable Results for Model A and B for Schizophrenia Sample 
 Model Fit 
 χ2 df p CFI RMSEA   
Full Model A 15.6 18 .623 1.00 <.001   
   a=0, no covariation 43.2 19 .001 .729 .170   
   b=0, no NC→FO 17.5 19 .557 1.00 <.001   
   c=0, no SC→FO 16.8 19 .601 1.00 <.001   
Full Model B 15.6 18 .623 1.00 <.001   
   a=0, no mediation 43.2 19 .001 .729 .170   
   b=0, no NC→FO 17.5 19 .557 1.00 <.001   
   c=0, no SC→FO 16.8 19 .601 1.00 <.001   
                                   Parameter Estimates 
 SC↔
NC 
p SC→FO p NC→FO p  
Full Model A .580 <.001 2.51 .427 -2.55 .331  
   a=0, no covariation N/A  1.04 .126 -1.07 .014  
   b=0, no NC→FO .599 <.001 -.452 .369 N/A   
   c=0, no SC→FO .593 <.001 N/A  -.494 .231  
Full Model B NC→
SC 
p SC→FO p NC→FO p Ind NC→FO 
  a=0, no mediation .780 <.001 2.51 .427 -2.55 .331 1.96 
  b=0, no NC→FO N/A  1.04 .126 -1.07 .014 N/A 
  c=0, no SC→FO .780 <.001 -.452 .369 N/A  -.352 
Note. CFI=Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA=Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation, SC=Social 
Cognition, NC=Neurocognition, FO=Functional Outcome, Ind=Indirect Effect. 
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Table 5. Correlations among Composites in Schizophrenia and HFA Samples. 
 Social Cog Composite Functional Outcome Composite 
 r (p) r (p) 
Schizophrenia Sample   
Social Cog Composite . -.005 (.973) 
Neurocog Composite .654** (.000) -.248 (.101) 
   
HFA Sample   
Social Cog Composite . -.109 (.551) 
Neurocog Composite .448** (.008) .087 (.635) 
Note. Social Cog=Social Cognition, Neurocog=Neurocognition, HFA=High-functioning 
Autism, **p<.01 
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Table 6.  Correlations among Neurocognitive and Social Cognitive Measures in HFA and 
Schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia Sample Movie Stills Point Light Eyes Test 
IQ     .424**    .398**   .628** 
General Perception     .400** .308*   .384** 
Executive Function .264  .322* .305* 
Verbal Fluency   .296*  .381*   .549** 
    
HFA Sample    
IQ      .522**       .498**     .753**  
General Perception  .315   .033 .189  
Executive Function  .306   .027 .244 
Verbal Fluency -.068 -.015 .316  
Note.  HFA=High-Functioning Autism, **p<.01, *p<.05, Bonferroni corrected alpha=.004, 
Bold-faced items significant at Bonferroni level. 
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Table 7. Correlations between Neurocognitive and Social Cognitive Measures with 
Functional Outcome  
Schizophrenia Sample Prosocial Recreation Independ Perf 
IQ   -.327*  -.055   .068  
General Perception     -.536** -.261    .077  
Executive Function -.246  -.089  -.026  
Verbal Fluency -.202   .004  -.080  
Movie Stills -.064   .038     .297*  
Point Light -.210  -.036   .270  
Eyes Test   -.341*  -.068   .249  
    
HFA Sample    
IQ   -.384*  -.025  -.046 
General Perception -.022    .153    .249  
Executive Function -.077   .346    .308  
Verbal Fluency -.142    .107  -.014  
Movie Stills -.021    .228    .193  
Point Light -.322  -.011  -.088  
Eyes Test     -.513**  -.084  -.063  
Note. HFA=High-Functioning Autism, Independ Perf=Independence Performance subscale 
of SFS, **p<.01, *p<.05, Bonferroni corrected alpha=.002, Bold-faced items significant at 
Bonferroni level. 
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Figure 2. Model B: Conceptual
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Figure 3. Model A: Latent Variables
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